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Abstract 
The purpose of the present thesis was to investigate whether and how familiarity 
influences coordination, resilience, and efficiency in high performance teams in safety-
critical organizations. Research has accumulated solid support for the general presumption 
that shared mental models are associated with team effectiveness (see overview, Kozlowski 
& Ilgen, 2006). Unfortunately, familiarity and shared mental models have seldom been the 
subject of investigation. This is surprising since the importance of team members having a 
shared understanding is underlined in dynamic situations that require high levels of 
flexibility and adaptability in the team (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Salas & Fiore, 2004). 
The first study investigated whether knowledge about individual team members 
would augment the effect of operational skills in predicting operational effectiveness in 
trained expert teams. The second study investigated the consequences of shared mental 
models (SMM) of team members in teams that are forced to coordinate their activities 
towards a shared goal in a distributed team setting. The third study investigated whether 
shared mental models of team members would transfer across new tasks or situations and, 
through better coordination, result in improved efficiency and less physiological arousal.  
Study 1 included samples from 24 active duty officers who made up four submarine 
attack teams. Studies 2 and 3 included a total of 177 cadets from the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy.  The findings from these three studies indicate that familiar teams used 
coordination strategies that enhanced efficiency. The coordination strategies used by familiar 
teams are characterized by less overt communication (statements per minute) during high 
workload (Study 1), a higher global anticipation rate (Study 2), and more adaptability and 
back-up statements during cross-training (Study 3). In addition, familiar teams showed more 
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overt communication (e.g., confirmation) when confronted with a novel situation (Studies 2 
and 3). Familiar teams outperformed unfamiliar teams, being more accurate, quicker and 
achieving greater mission success (i.e., more hits). Familiar teams were more 
physiologically aroused (HR) during low workload (Study 2), and less during high workload 
(Study 1), recovery (Studies 2 and 3), and decreasingly so during training (Study 3).  
These three studies extend previous research by presenting new empirical data on the 
significance of shared mental models of team members. Study 1 demonstrated that 
knowledge about team members (i.e., shared mental models of team members) adds to 
performance over and above the contribution of operational skills (Aim 1). Studies 2 
confirmed Study 1 (within teams) and provide empirical evidence for the effect of shared 
mental models of team members in distributed teams (Aim 2). The findings from Study 3 
suggest that shared mental models of team members are transferable across tasks and 
enhance the effects of cross-training (Aim 3). All studies extend previous research, but 
Study 3 in particular indicates that shared mental models of team members are distinctly 
different from transactive memory systems (Aim 3). Hence, a shared mental model of team 
members represents an independent, adaptive asset at team level that enhances team 
performance and efficiency.  
These studies are the first to provide empirical evidence in support of the notion that 
shared mental models of team members are a mechanism that improves teams’ efficiency, 
resilience, and coordination. This thesis confirms shared mental models of team members as 
an important and independent construct with an added value in relation to team performance 
and efficiency.  It thus expands previous knowledge, where the focus has been on 
equipment, tasks, and team interaction. The findings are a contribution to and fill an 
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important gap in the literature on Shared Mental Models. Implications are discussed for 
training, staffing and safety issues in teams in safety-critical organizations.  
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1. Introduction 
“Imagine yourself on the operation table, surrounded by doctors and nurses with one 
goal: to save your life. Nobody in the room had met each other before the shift 
started ten minutes ago.  The scope of the present thesis is to investigate whether 
familiarity influences coordination, resilience, and efficiency in high performance 
teams in safety-critical organizations.”        
In safety-critical organizations (SCOs) such as aviation organizations and emergency 
services, as well as the military rotation of personnel through a 24/7 shift-work schedule, it 
is difficult to maintain stable person/role expectations over time. Many teams thus consist of 
team members with little or no previous history as a team. In this thesis, teams are defined as 
two or more people carrying out highly interdependent tasks based on expertise distributed 
among team members with clearly assigned roles and responsibilities, such as medical teams 
(i.e., anesthesiologist and surgeon).  Such teams work in a dynamic environment (e.g., an 
operating theatre), share values and common goals (e.g., to save life) and exist for a limited 
lifespan (e.g., a work shift; Stagl, Salas, Rosen, Priest, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007).  
Many SCOs require domain experts to work together in teams (e.g., emergency 
response units, control room operators, security task forces). Hackman (1998) concluded, 
however, that designing teams solely on the basis of members’ expertise is no guarantee of 
success. In many cases, information management systems have been introduced to enhance 
team communication and information exchange. Stagl et al. (2007) pointed out, however, 
that merely connecting experts with collaborate technology was not sufficient to guarantee 
effective performance (e.g., distributed teams). In many cases, work teams in safety-critical 
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organizations will be forced to handle complex, difficult, and vital tasks in situations in 
which they are not familiar with the other expert members of the team.  
The ability to adapt to high workload, time constraints, and uncertainty is vital to team 
performance and efficiency in high-intensity situations. The focus in this thesis is therefore 
on what teams do: their tasks, not their interpersonal interaction (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). 
It is therefore important to identify team processes relating to performance and effectiveness. 
Performance consists of the activities teams engage in to coordinate each team member’s 
effort to reach the common goal (i.e., exchange of information).  Efficiency is the outcome 
of the team’s performance and is understood in terms of accuracy, latency, and mission 
success (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997; Motowildo, 2003). Conceptually, team processes 
capture how team members combine resources, coordinating their knowledge, skills and 
efforts to meet task demands (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Salas and Fiore (2004) stated that 
there is substantial evidence that team cognition, understood as a type of interrelationship 
between team processes (e.g., encoding, storage, and retrieval of information), is vital to 
team performance in high-workload environments such as aviation, medicine and the 
military. 
 Small group research has a long tradition of studying cognitive constructs such as group 
norms and role expectations that guide interpersonal interaction among team members 
(Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Interpersonal interaction is important to team performance, for 
instance by influencing how willing we are to share information with other team members. 
In a knowledge-driven context, constructs that capture task-relevant interaction are of equal 
interest when performance and effectiveness are the subjects under investigation. Thus, 
familiarity is more than interpersonal relations and likes or dislikes. It is also about 
understanding other team members’ behavior while performing tasks. If you do not 
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understand the behavior (what or why) of a team member, then coordination (e.g., back-up 
behavior) is difficult and your willingness to provide information is of less importance. 
Thus, it is surprising to discover that research on team cognition and task-related issues is 
rarely related to familiarity in teams. Mohammed, Ferzandi, and Hamilton (2010) stated in 
an overview of the field of team cognition that the role of “time together as a team” had been 
largely downplayed in past research on team cognition.  
The sparse research on familiarity in teams that is available is also contradictive. After 
analyzing 74 major accidents in the airline industry, Woody, McKinney, Barker, and 
Clothier (1994) concluded that newly-formed (unknown) crews flew more safely then fixed 
(known) crews. This prompted a policy among several airlines of rotating crew members in 
order to ensure compliance with procedures, arguing that this results in increased safety. 
This view is challenged by Kanki and Foushee (1989), however. They found empirical 
evidence that, if the captain and co-pilot had recently flown together, they made fewer errors 
and engaged in more open communication in the information exchange context. Thus, a 
critical issue in SCOs is how team members’ familiarity will result in effective command, 
control, and communication (C3) to resolve safety-critical issues.  
The literature on team processes offers two theoretical perspectives on team 
cognition that seem to take quite different approaches to explaining the outcome of team 
familiarity compared to unfamiliarity. In their concept of shared mental models (SMM), 
Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse (1993) suggest that more effective teams share similar 
mental models and understandings of the situation at hand. Wegner (1986), on the other 
hand, proposes that effective team work is based on a transactive memory system whereby 
team members compartmentalize and specialize in different work segments.  These 
apparently different perspectives raise the question of whether transactive memory systems 
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and the shared mental models of team members are distinctly different, and how these 
differences might impact on team performance in SCO’s.  
Research has accumulated substantial support for the general presumption that shared 
mental models are associated with team effectiveness (see overview, Kozlowski & Ilgen, 
2006). Unfortunately, familiarity and shared mental models have seldom been the subject of 
investigation. This is surprising because the importance of team members having a shared 
understanding is underlined in dynamic situations that require high levels of flexibility and 
adaptability in the team (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Salas & Fiore, 2004). This indicates 
an important asset in teamwork, the transferability to novel situations, and a vital ability in 
SCO’s, where procedures and routine are dominant, but where anomalies have the potential 
to result in severe consequences if not handled correctly.  However, if shared mental models 
are transferrable across different tasks (Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005), we would assume that 
teams whose members have shared mental models will be able to adapt better to a new team 
performance situation. This may mean that shared mental models of team members enhance 
a team’s ability to understand and learn novel tasks and situations. One important aim of the 
present thesis is thus to examine whether shared mental models of team members will 
transfer across new tasks or situations and ultimately result in improved performance.  
The thesis will first investigate whether and, if applicable, how familiarity might 
impact on team performance.  Some teams are physically separated (distributed) and have 
fewer opportunities to coordinate due to the absence of paralinguistic, non-verbal and other 
sensory cues. Thus, any advantages of familiarity within teams could be hampered by 
physical separation between team members, and this is the subject of the second 
investigation. Expert teams also encounter novel situations, and the last question to address 
 16
is whether familiarity with other team members will prepare teams for the unexpected (novel 
situations) or, to put it another way, whether they will learn more quickly. 
 The thesis starts with a brief outline of team cognition, followed by a presentation of 
the two cognitive constructs that are intended to capture familiarity in teams: transactive 
memory systems (Wegner 1986) and shared mental models (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). 
The next step outlines the construct of shared mental models of team members, and presents 
the aims of the three studies, the research model, and how the studies were conducted and 
operationalized. The findings are then presented and discussed. In the following, these issues 
are set out in more detail.   
1.1 Team cognition 
Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) contend that teams are at the center of how work gets 
done in modern life. The idea seems to be that many tasks exceed the individual’s capability 
to cope efficiently and are more effectively solved by coordinated action by multiple 
individuals. This is based on teams being able to respond more quickly and being more 
adaptable than individuals to changing, complex and often unexpected events in the 
environment. This assumption has encountered several challenges, and investigations of 
many disastrous aviation, military, medical and industrial accidents have found teamwork 
breakdowns (e.g., coordination, communication; Wilson, Salas, Priest, & Andrews, 2007).   
In a complex and dynamic environment, teams often face rapidly evolving and 
ambiguous situations where one correct solution is not always evident or possible. In 
addition, modern technologies increase the pressure through information overload and 
limiting time available to act. Salas, Rosen, Burke, Nicholson, and Howse (2007) states that 
modern operational environments are characterized by a historically unparalleled 
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accelerating rate of change that requires team flexibility, adaptability, and resilience. To 
cope, team members must integrate, synthesize, and share information, and they need to 
coordinate and cooperate to accomplish their mission as task demands change.  For teams, 
then, a dynamic, shifting and complex environment gives rise to commensurate team task 
demands that members have to resolve through a coordinated process that combines their 
cognitive, motivational/affective and behavioral resources (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). 
Research has accumulated extensive knowledge about behavior (e.g., back-up behavior) and 
attitudes (e.g., team orientation) that teams need in order to be effective (Salas et al., 2005; 
Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006).  
Team cognition has been identified as a key component in achieving mission goals in 
dynamic, team-based, stressful, and distributed operations (Salas et al., 2007). By this is 
meant that team members possess knowledge that allows them to function effectively as an 
entity, even during periods of high workload (Orasanu, 1990). There are a number of 
possible theoretical perspectives on team cognition. Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) underlined 
four cognitive constructs that have amassed sufficient research to support their value in 
terms of enhancing team effectiveness, namely team climate, team learning, transactive 
memory system and team mental model. Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001) underline the 
problem of using several constructs and the dividing lines between them by commenting that 
authors have not been consistent in their definition of team cognition, listing no less than 20 
labels that have been used to describe various types (e.g., collective cognition, team 
knowledge, team mental models, shared knowledge, transactive memory, shared mental 
models, etc.). Rentsch and Woehr (2004) argue that all these perspectives share the 
assumption that common cognitions among team members will be associated with team 
effectiveness. Salas and Fiore (2004) contend and suggest that team cognition regarding the 
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nature of team members, or team member familiarity, is a potential important determinant of 
team functioning and team performance.  
An extensive search within the cognitive theoretical framework of team performance 
revealed that there are two constructs that have addressed familiarity. They are transactive 
memory systems (Wegner, 1986) and shared mental models (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). 
These perspectives argue that team members need to know each other as team members. 
This includes being familiar with their knowledge, abilities, preferences, strengths, and 
weaknesses. This is proposed as a necessary prerequisite for maximizing performance.  
1.2 Transactive memory systems 
Wegner (1986) proposed transactive memory systems (TMS) as a means of 
explaining how couples foster the development of a common memory. Moreland (1999) 
applied TMS to teams and conceptualized them as a set of distributed, individual memory 
systems that combine the knowledge possessed by particular team members with a shared 
awareness of who knows what. Thus, with regard to teams, TMS is a group-level collective 
system for encoding, storing, and retrieving information distributed within the team. In this 
theoretical framework, it is proposed that each team member uses the other members as an 
external memory aid, thereby creating a compatible and distributed memory system. In this 
model, team effectiveness depends on team specialization and increased capacity. Moreland 
(1999) posits that this will enable the team to plan its work more sensibly, assigning tasks to 
the people who will perform them best and improving coordination because the team 
members can anticipate rather than simply react to each others’ behavior. Using laboratory 
experiments in which small groups were trained to perform complex tasks (assemble radios), 
these researchers assessed the impact of various types of individual and group training on 
group performance. Their findings indicated that groups performed better when their 
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members were trained together rather than separately, and they suggest that the benefits of 
group training depended heavily on the operation of transaction memory systems (Moreland, 
1999).  
In both laboratory and field settings, transactive memory systems have been linked to 
performance and job satisfaction (Austin, 2003; Lewis, 2004; Pearsall & Ellis, 2006). 
Conceptually, transactive memory systems should reduce the cognitive load on individuals 
and lower redundancy (Hollingshead, 1998).  In an overview, Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) 
concluded that TMS as a concept was still in its infancy and that there was a lag between 
empirical research and theoretical development. They also underline the importance of 
distinguishing it from other related concepts, and especially shared mental models. 
Mohammed et al. (2010) concluded in a review that empirical studies were needed to 
determine how shared mental models and transactive memory systems relate to team 
processes and outcomes. Lewis (2006) suggests that the two concepts are related but 
distinctly different. 
Since TMS theory and research has concentrated on knowledge about team output 
and the utilization of task knowledge among team members (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 
2010; Mohammed et al., 2010, Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006), this theoretical framework does 
not address or explain the team processes required to deal with the unexpected. A team 
facing a novel critical situation needs more than task-specific knowledge to adapt and cope 
(Mohammed et al., 2010). Knowledge about how a team member behaves, for instance when 
he or she is almost overwhelmed by the workload, is not addressed in TMS research. This 
thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the possible impact on 
performance and efficiency of having a shared awareness and knowledge of how team 
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members behave when they, as a team, encounter a new, novel, and uncertain situation 
characterized by high workload and time constraints.   
1.3 Shared Mental Models 
The significance of shared mental models and team coordination was emphasized in the 
research project “Tactical Decision Making under Stress” (TADMUS), initiated after the 
USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian airbus in 1988. TADMUS was an applied 
research program in the U.S. Department of Defense. In brief, the goal of the TADMUS 
program was to develop training, simulation, decision support, and display principles that 
would help to mitigate the impact of stress on decision-making (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 
1998). The program placed particular emphasis on information processing and tactical 
decisions made by shipboard command teams in air defense operations under conditions 
involving short decision times, high operational workload, and ambiguous and incomplete 
information.  One of the conclusions from the TADMUS project was the importance of swift 
and accurate coordination of information and behavior in order to successfully cope with the 
demands of emergency combat situations (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998).  
Research into team effectiveness supports the conclusions from the TADMUS project, 
showing that effective teams can maintain performance even under conditions of high 
workload when opportunities for communication are reduced (e.g., Kleinman & Serfaty, 
1989). This indicates a need for team coordination strategies that are implicit and automatic 
(Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989; Entin & Serfaty, 1999). Wittenbaum, Vaughan & Stasser (1998) 
argue that coordination is an essential component of successful team performance. They 
underline that successful teams coordinate their efforts by communicating implicitly. 
Coordinating implicitly saves time, but it can also increase the possibility of failure 
(Wittenbaum et al., 1998).  It is therefore suggested that successful implicit coordination 
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rests on the team’s ability to share a common understanding of the situation (Cannon-
Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996; 
Rentsch & Hall, 1994; Mathieu, Rapp, Maynard, & Magos, 2010; Mathieu, Heffner, & 
Goodwin, 2005; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Marks, 
Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002).   
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) proposed that shared mental models are the mechanism 
that allows this type of coordination (implicit). The construct of shared mental models is 
drawn from theories of individual mental models used to explicate individual cognitive 
functioning or understanding. At the individual level, mental models refer to a structure of 
known elements (e.g., declarative knowledge) and the relationship between those elements 
(Shavelson, 1974).  These structures serve as mechanisms that people use in order to 
describe the purpose and form of a system, as well as its functioning in its present and future 
state (Rouse & Morris, 1986).  Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1990) proposed extending the 
concept of individual mental models to the team performance domain, hypothesizing that 
team performance is a function of the extent to which members held similarly organized 
expectations in relation to the task or each other. Shared mental models are defined as a 
shared organized understanding and mental representation of key elements of the team’s 
relevant environment. These shared mental models enable team members to form accurate 
explanations and expectations of the task. This will in turn enable team members to 
coordinate their actions and adapt their behavior to the demands of the task and to other team 
members (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Shared mental models (SMM) are assumed to 
enable team members to predict task needs and the actions of other team members, and thus 
enable them to adapt their own behavior accordingly without communicating explicitly. A 
number of studies have indicated that shared mental models contribute to increased team 
effectiveness (Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Spector, 1996; Urban, Bowers, Monday, & 
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Morgan, 1995; Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999; Mathieu et al., 2000, 
2005, 2010).  
More specifically, in order to coordinate their activity, teams with a shared mental 
model will not only reduce the amount of communication they use (i.e., coordinate 
implicitly), they will also change their communication patterns from pulling (requesting) to 
pushing (presenting) information when the workload increases. According to Entin and 
Serfaty (1999), this shift in communication pattern is reflected in the ratio that results when 
the number of transfers of information is divided by the number of requests for information 
(“the global anticipation ratio”). An increase in “the global anticipation ratio” is seen as 
being a strong indication of a shared mental model (Entin & Serfaty, 1999). As an example, 
Orasanu (1990) reported that superior performing teams increased the push of information 
from team members and reduced requests for information from the team leader during 
periods of high workload.  
1.3.1 Multiple mental models 
Salas et al. (2005) contend that shared mental models are a core aspect of the successful 
coordination of information and behavior in expert teams. They reviewed 138 models from 
the literature and proposed five essential behaviors that promote team effectiveness. These 
behaviors are team leadership, mutual performance monitoring, backup behavior, 
adaptability, and team orientation. Salas et al. (2005) underline shared mental models as a 
supporting and coordinating mechanism that is especially important in relation to 
performance monitoring, backup behavior and adaptability. Shared mental models are based 
on the assumption that highly effective operational teams are able to understand the system 
at several levels. To make this possible, multiple shared models must be in action at the 
same time (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Rouse and Morris (1986) proposed a taxonomy of 
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mental models in which every level or type of model differed in importance depending on 
which task was to be solved. Some problems are solved through one type of mental model, 
while other problems are solved by integrating several mental models.  
 Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) proposed four types of shared mental models:  
(a) Technology/equipment. To extract information, team members need to share an 
understanding and knowledge of how to control the technology and equipment with which 
they are interacting. This includes operating procedures, limitations and likely failures.  
(b) Task at hand. It is also important that team members understand the task at hand and 
how to carry it out. This is shared knowledge about what information is important and how 
different types of information must be combined to give meaning. It is also important for the 
team members to understand the dynamics of the environment and how this impacts on their 
tasks (i.e., time constraints or uncertainty). This includes task procedures, task strategies, 
environmental constraints, likely contingencies, and scenarios.  
(c) Team interaction. Each team member has to understand his/her own role in the 
overall task, what they as an individual team member contribute and how this is 
accomplished. This requires a common understanding of who needs what and when in the 
team. This will enable the team members to understand when they must monitor other team 
members to support them with the proper behavior or information, if required. This includes 
their roles/responsibilities, information sources, interaction patterns, communication 
channels, as well as role interdependencies.    
(d) Team members. Team members must be familiar with the knowledge, skills, 
abilities, preferences, and other task-relevant attributes of their team-mates. It is proposed 
that their expectations of the behavior of their team-mates will vary as a function of who 
makes up the team. And a shared mental model of team members enables team members to 
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adjust their own behavior to the other team members (e.g., one team member is on the verge 
of becoming overwhelmed by a high workload and other team members give support by 
taking on some of workload).   
Shared mental models related to the equipment, task, and team interaction are 
particularly emphasized in the research (Volpe et al., 1996; Urban et al., 1995; Stout et al., 
1999). It is proposed that the importance of shared mental models of team members 
increases when teams operate in dynamic situations that require high levels of flexibility and 
adaptability (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993).  This is because it is proposed that familiarity 
fosters understanding in the team with regard to how team members operate, what they are 
likely to do, and what information they will require. This enhances the ability to develop 
viable expectations of performance. In spite of repeated statements underlining the 
importance of shared mental models of team members, few empirical studies have been 
published on this factor. This is surprising given how widespread teams unfamiliar with each 
other are in our society. 
1.4 The missing link or shared mental models of team members 
While the SMM theory appears promising in relation to explaining connections 
between familiarity and team efficiency, the literature on SMM has gone in different 
directions and faced challenges that have remained unaddressed since the concept was 
introduced in 1993 by Cannon-Bowers et al. One line of thinking started when Klimoski and 
Mohammed (1994) proposed combining team interaction models and team member models 
into one category: team mental models. Mathieu et al. (2000; 2005; 2010) and others 
(Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Lim & Klein, 2006) argue that shared mental models of 
team interaction processes have a significant effect on team performance. This was followed 
up by research, especially by Mathieu et al. (2000; 2005; 2010). For instance,  based on self-
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reports from team members with no previous history as a team, Mathieu et al. (2000) 
investigated the similarity of team members’ ratings of team processes and showed that 
similarity enhanced team effectiveness. The problem with this line of research is not the 
important findings relating to the similarity of the understanding of the interaction process, 
but that the incorporated shared mental models of team members seem to be almost non-
existent in the studies conducted so far. This indicates a crucial gap in research following the 
same track as Klimoski and Mohammed (1994). 
 To my knowledge, only two studies exist within the SMM theoretical framework that 
address familiarity in teams and thereby attempt to capture the shared mental models of team 
members. First, Cooke, Gorman, Duran and Taylor (2007) compared experienced command 
and control (CiC) teams and ad hoc student teams in relation to the performance of a task 
unknown to both types of team. They concluded that the superior performance during low 
workload by the experienced CiC teams was due to their having a better understanding or 
knowledge of appropriate communication strategy, and not to familiarity within the team. 
This study can thus be seen as another example of the Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) 
position. But, Cooke et al. (2007) also unexpectedly found that experienced teams had no 
advantage during high workload, showing no differences in performance or coordination 
compared to the inexperienced student teams. This contradicts the core of the SMM 
approach, which proposes that a shared mental model enables the team to implicitly 
coordinate its actions and be more efficient in a high intensity and novel situation. These 
authors contend that future studies should attempt to disentangle the relative contribution of 
familiarity. Thus, in view of these findings, it is still an open question whether teams with 
extensive previous knowledge about members’ characteristics perform better than teams 
without such knowledge.  
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Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas (2009) concluded that their study 
was the first to demonstrate that shared mental models regarding specific team-mates (who 
had worked on previous teams) are positively associated with requests for backup on the job. 
An extensive literature search indicates that this is also the only study that has tried to 
capture shared mental models of team members. However, they were unable to establish 
whether the connection between familiarity and backup behavior facilitates team 
performance outcome. In addition, studies of backup behavior have produced inconsistent 
results. Porter, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Ellis, West and Moon (2003) found that backup behavior 
enhanced performance, while Barnes, Hollenbeck, Wagner, DeRue, Nahrgang, and Schwind 
(2008) found that team members who receive a lot of back-up from other team members 
reduce their task work in subsequent tasks.  Based on the sparse and inconsistent results, 
Smith-Jentsch et al. (2009) suggested that future research should investigate the importance 
of familiarity and backup behavior in team performance.  
  The transactive memory system theory and findings relating to it provide insight 
into and important knowledge about team processes. It is still an open question, however, 
whether transactive memory systems represent the fourth content domain in the shared 
mental model theory (i.e., the shared mental model of team members proposed by Cannon-
Bowers et al., 1993).  Several researchers seems to fall into this line of thinking, which is 
evidenced by little research being conducted into shared mental models of team members 
and, implicitly, by the transactive memory system often being cited as an example of a 
shared mental model of team members (e.g., Salas et al., 2009). At the same time, several 
researchers, including those who incorporate transactive memory systems into the domain of 
shared mental models of team members as examples (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2009), call for 
empirical evidence for the boundaries of and scope of the concept in question, i.e., shared 
mental models of team members. Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) underline the need for clear 
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conceptual and empirical demarcations between team cognitive constructs of mental models 
and transactive memory. This is followed up by Salas et al. (2009), who argue for a need to 
provide operational and measurable definitions of what shared cognition is and what 
contributes to it. Mohammed et al. (2010) state that there is still much conceptual confusion 
about what distinguishes shared mental models of team members from transactive memory.  
The present thesis aims to address this issue and examine whether transactive memory 
systems and shared mental models of team members are distinctly different. It will also 
investigate whether shared mental models of team members add to team performance.  
Taken together, this leaves the concept of shared mental models of team members in 
a difficult position, with little empirical support and confusion with regard to its 
conceptualization. It might also be covered by other concepts (transactive memory systems). 
This leaves a vital gap in the literature, and more research on familiarity in the SMM 
approach is clearly needed.  
1.5 Aims of the studies 
1.5.1 Study 1 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether knowledge about individual team 
members would augment the effect of operational skills in predicting operational 
effectiveness in trained expert teams. More specifically, the objective was to examine 
whether a shared mental model of team members would add to team performance 
(communication, physiological arousal, and efficiency) over and above what could be 
explained by operational skills. This would contribute to closing the gap caused by the lack 
of empirical support for the notion of shared mental models of team members outlined 
previously.  
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1.5.2 Study 2 
If shared mental models of team members contribute over and above operational 
skills, it is an open question how this will affect the output of (distributed) teams that are 
forced to cooperate despite being in different geographical locations. This is of vital 
importance, since society in many cases relies on seamless cooperation between distributed 
teams. The aim of the present study was to investigate the consequences (for 
communication, physiological arousal, and efficiency) of shared mental models of team 
members in teams that are forced to coordinate their activities towards a shared goal in a 
distributed team setting.  
1.5.3 Study 3 
The aim of the third study was to examine whether shared mental models of team 
members will transfer to new tasks or situations and, through better coordination, result in 
improved efficiency and less physiological arousal. One issue of particular interest was how 
shared mental models of team members would influence team performance and adaptation to 
a radically changed context represented by cross-training (each member is trained in the 
specific tasks, duties, and responsibilities of his or her fellow team members) and in a high 
fidelity simulation exercise.  
Thus, this study investigates whether a familiar team learns faster than unfamiliar 
teams. If the results from the studies show an effect of familiarity on the output of expert 
teams (Study 1), improved performance in distributed teams (Study 2) and faster learning 
(Study 3), it will remain an issue whether or not this is caused by shared mental models. 
Thus, a second aim of the third study was to investigate whether the possible effect of 
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familiarity was caused by transactive memory systems or by shared mental models of team 
members. 
1.6 Overall research model 
On the basis of emerging research relating to shared mental models, it is reasonable 
to assume that knowledge about other team members will influence the team’s outcome, 
processes, and resilience in relation to stressors in high-intensity situations. An IPO model 
was selected (see Figure 1) to investigate the Input (shared mental model of team members), 
Process (coordination behavior, e.g. implicit communication), and Outcome (performance 
outcome, e.g., mission success).  
Outcome measures provide information about results, but not about how they were 
accomplished. It is essential, therefore, to consider processes that can contribute to the 
observed outcomes. Cooke, Salas, Kiekel and Bell (2004) propose that attributes of team 
cognition can be inferred from measuring team processes and behaviors. The general idea is 
that, if familiar teams outperform unfamiliar teams and show more processes connected to 
the SMM concept (e.g., backup behavior and anticipation ratio), then this will indicate the 
presence of a shared mental model of team members. Another strong indicator of a shared 
mental model is a shift in communication strategy in response to changing workload, since 
this is an indicator of a change between explicit and implicit communication strategies 
(Salas et al., 2007). 
Although the IPO approach is well accepted and often used in teamwork research, 
Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) have criticized it. Thus, while it has been challenged for being 
static and to some extent oversimplifying complex connections, the IPO model has proven 
highly robust and adaptable (Salas et al., 2009). It has been an aim of this thesis to 
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investigate the existence of shared mental models of team members and their impact at a 
given time, to uncover a possible difference in coordination and efficiency between familiar 
and unfamiliar teams. An IPO model suits this purpose, and the whole method will be in 
accordance with it.  
Shared Mental Models
of
Team members
Coordination Outcome
Input Process Output
Anticipating and 
predicting other 
team members
Identity changes in 
the team and 
implicitly adjusting 
strategies 
Implicit: Less 
communication
Global anticipation 
ratio
Adjusting (implicitly):
monitoring 
Backup 
Adaptive                   
Closed loop
Accuracy
Latency
Mission success
Resilience
Adaption
Learning
 
Figure 1: The overall research model: Input factors (e.g. Shared mental models of team members) 
function through Processes (e.g., backup behavior) to influence Output (e.g., mission success)- The IPO 
model (Goodwin, Burke, Wildman & Salas, 2009)  
1.6.1 Input 
This thesis aims to compare groups of familiar teams (with shared mental models of 
team members) to groups of teams unfamiliar with each other. Salas et al. (2005) propose 
that all four types of shared mental models enable the team to be more efficient. Following 
the logic of Salas et al. (2005), teams with shared mental models of team members will have 
three advantages compared to unfamiliar teams. First, they will be better able to identify 
changes in the team (e.g., a team member is nervous; has discovered a discrepancy in the 
surroundings). Second, and based on the identification of change, shared knowledge of each 
others’ characteristics, preferences, tendencies, and abilities also increases the likelihood of 
understanding why the team member has changed behavior and what he or she will do next. 
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Therefore, shared mental models of team members can enhance the ability to predict team 
members’ future actions and to know what reaction (e.g., support) this team member needs 
from other team members. Taken together, better identification of change and better 
prediction of team members’ actions enable the team to implicitly adjust coordination 
strategy to one that suits this particular team best in a given situation. Thus, to confirm the 
presence of shared mental models of team members, change (e.g., from low to high 
workload) and the substance (e.g., implicit) of coordination strategies relating to the general 
SMM concept are of special interest (Salas et al., 2007).   
1.6.2  Processes 
Research in the TADMUS project was largely conducted on teams engaged in anti-
air warfare on U.S. Navy vessels. The environments these teams have to master are 
characterized by dependence on team effort, proficiency in specific and shared tasks, and 
distinct roles among the team members (see Duncan, Rouse, Johnston, Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas, & Burns, 1996, for an overview). Through in-depth interviews, observations, and 
comparison of errors between experts and novices in expert teams, a number of core 
characteristics of coordination strategies in teams with shared mental models were extracted. 
They indicated that teams with a shared mental model will spend less time communicating 
and that the frequency of requests to repeat information or ask why a team member is taking 
some action will be reduced (Duncan et al., 1996). 
Orasanu (1990) showed that effective aircrews dealt with difficult situations by using 
an increased amount of unasked-for information. At the same time, the captains reduced 
requests for information. Less effective teams displayed the opposite information exchange 
strategies. In the TADMUS project, the information exchange strategies used by effective 
teams were interpreted as an index of the presence of a shared mental model in the team. It 
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was stated that a shared mental model made it possible for the team to give each other vital 
information in a proper and orderly manner without the receiver asking for it. This enabled 
the team to focus on the essentials of the task they were facing. Thus, the number of times 
unsolicited information was offered was seen as important confirmation of the presence of a 
shared mental model. Hence, as an indication of a shared mental model of team members, 
less communication and fewer requests during high workload are anticipated for familiar 
teams (Duncan et al., 1996). 
 Implicit coordination depends on the team’s ability to share a common understanding 
of the situation, which is a core element of the shared mental model approach (Cannon-
Bowers et al., 1993).  More specifically, to coordinate their activity, teams with shared 
mental models will not only reduce the amount of communication they use (implicitly), they 
will also change their communication patterns from pulling (requesting) to pushing 
(presenting) information when the workload increases. According to Entin and Serfaty 
(1999), this shift in communication pattern is reflected in the ratio that results when transfers 
of information are divided by requests for information (“the global anticipation ratio”). An 
increase in “the global anticipation ratio” during high workload is seen as a strong indication 
of a shared mental model (Entin & Serfaty, 1999). As an example, Orasanu (1990) reported 
that superior teams increased the push of information from team members and reduced 
requests for information from the team leader during high workload periods. Hence, an 
indication of a shared mental model of team members is expected to be an enhanced global 
anticipation ratio (more “push” of information) from low to high workload conditions (Entin 
& Serfaty, 1999).  
Salas et al. (2005) emphasize that three out of five teamwork behaviors are closely 
connected to the shared mental model concept: adaptability, backup behavior, and mutual 
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monitoring behavior. Adaptability is defined as the ability to adjust strategies based on 
information gathered from the environment, which is dependent on backup behavior, or the 
team’s ability to anticipate other team members’ needs and carry out actions to spread the 
workload among members to achieve balance during high workload. Mutual performance 
monitoring is the ability to develop a common understanding of the team environment and 
apply appropriate task strategies to accurately monitor other team members’ performance. 
Hence, more adaptability, backup behavior, and mutual performance monitoring behavior 
are expected to be indications of a shared mental model of team members. 
In novel situations, it is expected that teams with a shared mental model of team 
members will implicitly adjust to more explicit communication and coordination processes. 
The explicit adjustment strategies pursued will manifest themselves in different ways if 
shared mental models of team members play a role in team coordination. A seemingly 
paradoxical effect will be that, in order to coordinate their activity, teams with shared mental 
models of team members will increase the amount of communication they use when 
confronted with a novel as opposed to a common situation. Hence, more communication 
when confronting a novel situation is anticipated to be an indication of a shared mental 
model of team members. 
Salas et al. (2005) emphasize the presence of closed loop communication as a 
coordinating mechanism for avoiding misunderstandings in communication and facilitating 
continuous updating of the team’s shared mental models. Closed loop communication means 
that team members confirm and repeat vital information such as time, place, geographical 
coordinates, etc. Hence, more closed loop communication when confronting an unfamiliar 
situation is anticipated to be an additional indication of a shared mental model of team 
members.  
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1.6.3 Output  
It is reasonable to suspect that teams with a shared mental model of each other will 
coordinate their activities differently (better), showing more teamwork behavior such as 
back-up and monitoring (Salas et al., 2005; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2009). The result is 
enhanced performance (e.g., fewer errors, mission success, more accuracy, latency; 
Griepentrog & Flemming, 2003; Mohammed, Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000; Stout et al., 
1999).   
From the above discussion, it is hypothesized that familiar teams will show enhanced 
efficiency as a result of better coordinating skills (i.e., inferred from the SMM concept) 
enabled by the shared mental model of team members. It is proposed that the importance of 
shared mental models will increase as teams have to perform in stressful conditions (Salas et 
al., 2005). Team performance in ambiguous, high fidelity situations will depend heavily on 
executive functions among team members, such as attention, memory, and planning. 
Cognitive flexibility is seen as a particularly important asset when confronted with a rapidly 
changing and hostile environment. Adaptive team functioning involves using and combining 
team roles/resources in a flexible manner in order to cope with a rapidly changing dynamic 
environment. Teams with shared mental models will be more resilient to stress effects, due 
to their redundancy and ability to supply, substitute, or select information based on a 
superior understanding of team role needs. Although stressors can reduce the amount of 
information flow, and team members may become more limited with respect to the tasks 
they can perform, teams with shared mental models of team members will be able to 
coordinate explicitly and implicitly when necessary because of their knowledge of the 
person/role expectations in the team (Duncan et al., 1996). This will put a lower cognitive 
load on a team with a shared mental model of team members than on those without one. 
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Knowing the other team members and knowing that they will be able to provide support if 
necessary will reduce the perceived risk of failure and increase positive outcome 
expectancies. Gradual mastery of new tasks will result in fewer errors and more positive 
outcome expectancies over time. Hence, another output variable will be less physiological 
arousal during high workload condition.  
To sum up the IPO approach, it is suggested that a shared mental model of team 
members has an added value in team work. I anticipated that a shared mental model of team 
members would be a mechanism that improves coordination in the form of superior 
communication strategies (e.g., implicit) that enhance the ability to cope with high workload, 
physical separation and a novel situation, and result in greater efficiency and less 
physiological arousal.  
2.  Methods 
2.1. Participants 
2.1.1 Study 1 
The total population of attack teams on Norwegian ULA class submarines participated in the 
study. Twenty-four active duty officers made up four attack teams (six members per team). 
The officers ranged in rank from Lieutenant Commander to Second Lieutenant. The purpose 
of the attack team was to discover, classify, and, if necessary, attack the enemy. The 
participants’ mean age was 26.3 years (range = 24–33) and their experience ranged from 
four to 12 years in the submarine service. All members of the attack teams had worked 
together as teams for more than three months, with previous experience of operating in a 
simulator. 
2.1.2 Study 2 
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A total of 108 cadets from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy (mean age 24.2 
years, range 21-32) were recruited to the present study. The subjects’ military service 
background ranged from two to 10 years, 9.2% were female officers, and the subjects’ ranks 
ranged from Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant. Although the training was mandatory, 
participation in the research project was voluntary, and seven cadets declined to take part in 
the study, leaving a total of 101 subjects. Due to equipment failure, there were 84 subjects 
who completed the full video recording. None of the subjects had previous experience of the 
simulator or other forms of simulator training in general.  
2.1.3 Study 3 
A total of 69 cadets from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy (mean age 24 years, 
range 21-32) were recruited to the present study. The subjects’ military service background 
ranged from two to 10 years, 10% were female officers, and the subjects’ ranks ranged from 
Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant. Although the training was mandatory, participation in the 
research project was voluntary. Six of the cadets declined to participate in the part that 
involved Heart Rate (HR) measurement. Five subjects were lost due to equipment failure, 
leaving a total of 59 for the HR measurement. None of the subjects had previous experience 
of the simulator or other forms of simulator training in general.  
 
 
2.2 Input measurements 
2.2.1 Study 1 
A questionnaire was developed to evaluate operational knowledge in the teams. The 
questionnaire was based on interpositional knowledge (IPK; Volpe et al., 1996). This IPK 
was developed in cooperation with expert personnel in the submarine service. IPK refers to 
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the amount of knowledge a team member has of others, their own, and the team’s tasks, roles 
and proper responses in different situations.  
One scenario was run with an intact original team (familiar team). The second was 
performed with a second in command (2iC) from a different team (unfamiliar team). The 
runs were administered in balanced order.    
2.2.2 Study 2 
Subjects were categorized as members of familiar or unfamiliar teams. To be included in the 
familiar teams group, the team members had to have completed the first year of basic officer 
training together at the Norwegian Naval Academy. During this first year, the cadets are 
organized into permanent teams of six persons that stay together for eight months. During 
this period, the fixed teams share the hardship of a number of extensive exercises as well as 
a nine-week period on a tall-masted ship on a transatlantic crossing. This results in extensive 
knowledge about individual differences in competencies, skills, abilities, preferences, and 
tendencies (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). The present study included 13 familiar teams. 
The other category, the unfamiliar teams group, consisted of cadets from another cohort 
at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. The participants had no previous history together, 
either as individuals or as members of other teams, except for a one-week getting acquainted 
period at the start of the semester.  To control for any learning effects of being a cadet at the 
Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, eight teams of third-year cadets were formed. They 
neither had experience of each other as members of the same team during their own first 
year nor any history of attending the same classes during the second or third year. No 
differences were found between third-year cadets and the group that had just started on any 
measures. Hence, in the following, they were treated as one category, unfamiliar teams. 
Together, these subjects formed a total of 15 unfamiliar teams. 
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2.2.3 Study 3 
Subjects were categorized as members of teams with or without shared mental 
models of team members. To be included in the SMM of team members group, the team 
members had to have completed the first year of basic officer training together at the 
Norwegian Naval Academy. During this first year, the cadets are organized into permanent 
teams of six persons that stay together for eight months. During this period, the fixed teams 
share the hardship of a number of extensive exercises as well as an eleven-week period on a 
tall-masted ship on a transatlantic crossing. This results in extensive knowledge about 
individual differences in competencies, skills, abilities, preferences, and tendencies in their 
fellow cadets (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Due to the design of the simulator, the original 
six member teams were randomly divided into two teams of three subjects. Eleven familiar 
teams were put together. 
The other category, the unfamiliar teams, consisted of cadets from another cohort at 
the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. The participants had no previous history together, 
neither as individuals nor as members of other teams, except for a one-week getting 
acquainted period, at the start of the semester.  Together, these subjects randomly formed a 
total of twelve unfamiliar teams of three members.  
2.3 Process measurements 
Instrument. Verbal processes were examined using video and audio tape recordings (Sony 
TCM-459V) and video (Sony Super Steady Shot Handycam video HI8 CCD TR2200E PAL) 
2.3.1 Study 1 
Communication. Teamwork was evaluated on four dimensions: information exchange, 
communication, supporting behavior, and team initiative (based on ATOM; Smith-Jentsch, 
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Zeisig, Acton, & McPherson, 1998). The number of statements was registered as the total 
number of statements per minute and separated into three categories: request, transfer, and 
confirmation. Request and transfer were divided into information, actions, and problem 
solving. The sender and the receiver of every statement were also registered (Entin, 
Johnston, & Serfaty, 1998). Statements confirming request and transfer were registered 
(Salas et al., 2005).  
2.3.2 Study 2 
Communication. The number of statements was registered as the total number of statements 
per minute (Salas et al., 2005). In line with Entin et al. (1998), each statement was classified 
as a request for information, a transfer of information, an action or problem solving.  
The global anticipation ratio was calculated by dividing the total number of transfers 
by the total number of requests (Entin & Serfaty, 1999). The index was computed within 
teams as well as between teams.  
Non-verbal monitoring. Non-verbal behavior was examined on the basis of video recordings 
and labeled monitoring behavior (Salas et al., 2005). The number of glances at other 
positions, equipment, and other team members was registered. This resulted in a 
quantification of monitoring behavior.  
2.3.3 Study 3 
Communication. The number of statements was registered as the total number of statements 
per minute (Salas et al., 2005). To categorize information further, each statement was scored 
in accordance with Salas et al.’s (2005) team behavior indicating a shared mental model 
concept (i.e., adaptability, backup behavior, and mutual monitoring behavior). The present 
study focused on statements that it is proposed are related to implicit communication, i.e. 
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statements that were offered or carried through without being solicited by another team 
member. Thus each statement was categorized into: 
a. Updates/priorities, labeled adaptability, (e.g., ”we lost contact with the 
contact” or “that target is our main focus now”).  
b. Presenting information, actions, solutions, labeled backup, (e.g., “the correct 
course is” or “I have given the target the correct bearing”). 
c.     Offered information, actions, solutions, labeled mutual performance 
monitoring. (e.g., “I can give you the bearing now” or “Do you need a 
classification”).  
In addition, closed loop communication was quantified as indicators of an underlying 
mechanism to update shared mental models in general.  
d.    Confirmation, labeled closed loop (e.g., “received” or “did you get the    
bearing I sent you?”).  
 
  
2.4 Outcome measurements 
2.4.1 Study 1 
Instrument. The attack teams and their reactions were observed during two different war 
games in a ULA-class tactical trainer. This simulator is a replica of the submarine central, 
the natural workspace of an attack team. The simulator presented information about own 
speed and depth, as well as all available information about other ships that would be present 
for the attack team on board a real ULA-class submarine. Computer software in the 
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simulator recorded target solutions, firing range, hits, and the course and speed of own and 
other vessels.  
Efficiency. The criteria-based evaluation of efficiency consisted of latency and mission 
effectiveness (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). Latency was measured as the distance in 
meters to targets when firing, and torpedo hits.  Mission success was the number of 
torpedoes that hit the target. 
Physiological arousal. Cardiovascular responses were measured using the Ambulatory 
Monitoring System V. 3. 6. (AMS; Klaver, de Geus, & de Vries, 1994). The cardiac 
responses were measured using 8 mm Ag/AgC1 ECG electrodes (Cleartrode, Disposable 
Pregelled Electrodes, 150, Standard Silver). Heart rate was recorded as beats per minute 
(bpm). 
2.4.2 Study 2 
Instrument. The study was carried out in a high fidelity simulator that is a replica of a naval 
operations room. Expert instructors from the Royal Norwegian Navy developed the scenario 
used in the present study.  The scenario was event-based (Johnston, Payne, & Smith-Jentsch, 
1998). 
Efficiency. Measures were based on transcripts from the simulator, video and voice 
recordings. They were examined using a criteria-based evaluation of efficiency, consisting 
of accuracy, latency, and mission success (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997).    
Accuracy was a composite score based on observation of the following operational factors: 
discovered, monitored, made verbal contact, evaluated, made plans for handling the 
situation, informed (friendly vessel), and classification (the identity of the contact).  
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Latency was measured as an accumulated score based on reaction times (in seconds). To 
obtain this accumulated score, each of the eight events in the scenario was scored for how 
quickly the team responded.  
Mission success was defined according to the specific objective of the mission, i.e., to avoid 
or minimize the hostile threat to an oil tanker. 
Physiological arousal. Cardiovascular responses were measured using an Ambulatory 
Monitoring System V. 3. 6. (AMS; Klaver, de Geus, & de Vries, 1994). Heart rate (HR) was 
recorded as beats per minute (bpm).  
2.4.3 Study 3 
Instrument. The study was carried out in a high fidelity simulator. Three consoles for 
operating the firing of missiles and receiving detected radar transmission were arranged in a 
triangle facing each other. Computer software in the simulator recorded target solutions, 
firing range, hits, and the course and speed of all aircraft. 
Efficiency. Measures were based on transcripts from the simulator and examined using a 
criteria-based evaluation of mission success (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). Scores were 
defined according to the specific objective of the mission, which was to shoot down enemy 
aircraft and let friendly aircraft through.  
Physiological arousal. Cardiovascular responses were measured using Polar pulse watches. 
Heart rate (HR) was recorded as beats per minute (bpm).  
2.5 Procedure 
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For all the studies, the participants were informed about the study and invited to sign 
an informed consent one hour before each experiment started. 
2.5.1 Study 1  
All four attack teams were rated as operational and approved by their superiors as 
functioning at the highest level no longer two months before the start of this study. The two 
war game scenarios used in this study were consistent with the training program the attack 
teams normally undergo and were identical for all teams. The scenarios were event-based 
(Johnston et al., 1998), following a design similar to that used in the studies in the TADMUS 
project. The war games consisted of realistic stressors that gave the teams an increasing 
workload and need for coordination.  
The participants completed the IPK questionnaire and were then equipped with the 
AMS before entering the simulator. Each of the two war games lasted 50 minutes. To 
examine stress reactivity, each run was separated into two distinct phases, a low-stress phase 
and a high-stress situation in which the attack teams had several torpedoes in the water and a 
manipulated problem with the torpedoes. The problem was identical for all teams and both 
conditions.  
2.5.2 Study 2 
Each of the original six-member teams was randomly divided into two three-member 
teams. These two (sub) teams then manned two different simulator cubicles (i.e., naval 
vessels) with the common goal of providing close protection to an oil tanker in littoral 
waters. The tanker was sailing to an oil refinery. The two (sub) teams/vessels were faced 
with the challenge of coordinating their activities and controlling the area close to the tanker. 
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This involved surveillance and coordination of air and surface traffic in the area, and 
subsequent military actions to protect the tanker and prevent hostile actions.  
To examine the effects of workload, the scenario was separated into two phases, low 
and high workload. Team members were randomly assigned to one of two identical vessels 
and randomly assigned to three different positions in the operations room. These positions 
were electro-optical surveillance and firing, commanding officer, and overall picture.   
The subjects were told that the intention of the exercise was to prepare them for the next 
mission in the ongoing exercise they were participating in. The officer cadets were not given 
monetary rewards, and they were informed that the outcome of the experiment would not 
influence their military leadership grades.  Each team was told that the team that, after 
training, performed best would be given the next high-profile mission in the ongoing 
exercise they were taking part in.  
The study started with a 30-minute briefing on the scenario, describing the setting, 
order, intelligence information, the outline of the simulator and function of the equipment. 
This was followed by 30 minutes’ hands-on training in the designated position in the 
simulator. After this, the personnel were equipped with ambulatory cardiac recording 
equipment before entering a 30-minute planning phase. Baseline Heart Rate was recorded 
for five minutes before entering the simulator. Continuous recordings were obtained during 
the scenario in the simulator. After completion, another five minutes were recorded during 
recovery. All recordings were obtained while the subjects were seated. 
2.5.3 Study 3 
Pulse watches were administered and baseline HR was recorded while the 
participants were seated. HR was recorded through baseline, cross-training sessions, high 
fidelity simulation and recovery.  The subjects were told that the intention of the exercise 
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was to discover how quickly they were able to learn and cooperate. The officer cadets were 
not given monetary rewards, and they were informed that the outcome of the exercise would 
not influence their military leadership grade.  Each team was told that the team that, after 
training, performed best in the final test would be given the next high profile mission in the 
ongoing exercise they were taking part in.  
During the training scenarios, the three-member teams had to work interdependently 
towards the common goal of providing protection for an aircraft carrier in littoral waters. 
The aircraft carrier was at anchor, and its protection (safety) depended on the teams’ ability 
to shoot down unfriendly aircraft and allow friendly aircraft to operate in the area. This 
involved surveillance and coordination of air traffic in the area and subsequent military 
actions to protect the aircraft carrier.  This put great constraints on the teams’ efforts to 
coordinate their activities within the limited time at their disposal.  The scenario was 
designed to include realistic stressors that gave the teams an increasing workload and a 
greater need for coordination and communication between team members.   
Team members were randomly assigned to three different positions (team roles) in 
the operations room. They were: Early Warning (EW), Classification (CL), and Weapons 
control (WE). The main task of EW was to detect and get a bearing on unknown radar 
transmissions. EW was then given the task of discovering potential targets early and sending 
the data (radar characteristics) to CL, who was then able to classify them (from the checklist 
she or he alone held) as friendly or hostile. EW was also tasked with calculating the speed 
and course of potential targets based on own bearings and CL bearings. The main task of 
WE was to update the overall picture. The WE had a map of the area on the console but no 
sensor to give him/her a bearing or radar characteristics. Thus, WE’s ability to fire missiles 
was entirely dependent on cooperation between all positions. All team roles depended 
heavily on the performance of the other two.   
 46
The study started with a 30-minute briefing on the scenario, describing the setting, 
order, intelligence information, the outline of the simulator, and a functional demonstration 
of the equipment. This was followed by 30 minutes’ hands-on training in the designated 
position in the simulator.  
In order to examine the effects of cross-training, each team underwent an identical 
training period consisting of three similar 20-minute scenarios: C1, C2, and C3. All team 
members rotated between each of the team roles in scenarios C1, C2, and C3. In the final 
scenario, team members were again assigned their original role – the same as in C1. The 
high fidelity simulation scenario (S) was more intense, with more contacts from different 
directions, and a higher workload. 
  After completion, a five-minute HR recovery period was recorded. All recordings 
were obtained while the subjects were seated. 
2.6 Raters 
Two paid, independent raters categorized the information exchange in the teams in 
Studies 2 and 3. They were unfamiliar with the SMM theory, the scenario, and experimental 
set-up. Both raters were introduced to and trained in the use of the Noldus program (Noldus, 
1991; Noldus, Trienes, Hendriksen, Jansen, & Jansen, 2000).  The two raters established a 
common understanding of the categories by rating several videos together before the actual 
recording of the videos. The inter-rater reliability showed an intra-class correlation of .98 
(p<.01) in Study 2 and .93 (p<.01) in Study 3. This was based on the average of the two 
raters’ independent evaluations of three teams. The rating of the information exchange in 
Study 1 was conducted by the author.  
2.7 Design and statistics 
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2.7.1 Study 1 
T-tests for independent samples were used to test differences in IPK between the different 
attack teams. Analyses of performance during the simulator run were based on a repeated 
measures design (Ferguson, 1981), and t- tests for dependent samples were used to test 
differences between the two conditions. Due to the specific predictions about the directions 
of the means, one-tailed tests were used (Ferguson, 1981). Analyses of physiological arousal 
were performed using a 2 (known vs. unknown teams) × 2 (low-stress vs. high-stress phase) 
factorial design (Ferguson, 1981), using a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA); both 
factors were treated as repeated measures. Preplanned simple effects and contrasts were 
measured by means of one-tailed t- tests due to the direction of the predictions of the means 
(Wilcox, 1987). 
2.7.2 Study 2 
The study was carried out using a 2 (familiar teams vs. unfamiliar teams) x 2 (high vs. low 
workload phase) factorial design. Analyses of HR were performed as a manipulation check 
for the different phases of the simulation. Thus, a 2 (familiar teams vs. unfamiliar teams) x 4 
(baseline vs. low workload vs. high workload vs. recovery) factorial design (Ferguson, 1981) 
was used. The first factor was treated as a between-group factor and the second factor as a 
within-group factor in all analyses. When hypotheses based on specific predictions of the 
directions of the means were tested, non-significant interaction effects were followed up. 
(See Wilcox, 1987 for a discussion.) Stoline and Spjotvoll HSD tests for unequal sample 
sizes were used as post-hoc tests. 
2.7.3 Study 3 
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Efficiency and processes scores were studied using a 2 (familiar vs. unfamiliar) x 3 
(C1 vs. C2 vs. C3) factorial design (Ferguson, 1981). The first factor (groups) was treated as 
a between-group factor and the second factor (sessions) as a within-group factor in all 
analyses. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare efficiency and process 
differences between familiar and unfamiliar teams during the high fidelity simulation.  
Analyses of HR were performed using a 2 (familiar vs. unfamiliar) x 6 (baseline vs. 
C1 vs. C2 vs. C3 vs. high intensity simulation vs. recovery) factorial design (Ferguson, 
1981). The first factor was treated as a between-group factor and the second factor as a 
within-group factor in all analyses. All effects were followed up using a Tukey post-hoc test.  
3. Results 
3.1 Study 1 
In this study, submarine crews were studied during simulated attack operations. No 
differences were found between the teams on interpositional knowledge. The examination of 
the scores for IPK of the four 2iCs indicated that the scores were almost identical.  
When expert teams changed from an unknown to a known team member (role of 
second in command), the number of hits on target increased, while information exchange 
(statements per minute) and type (requests) decreased.  Looking at who said what, a similar 
pattern emerged; the commanding officer and the known 2iC verbalized significantly less 
compared to when the 2iC was unknown. All exchange of information in the triad, 
commanding officer – the rest of the team – 2iC, decreased when the 2iC was known. There 
were no differences between the commanding officer and the rest of the team. In addition, 
the commanding officer and the known 2iC exchanged significantly fewer requests 
compared to the unknown 2iC. 
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 Familiar teams showed less increase in physiological arousal (heart rate per minute) 
from low to high workload.  
This study demonstrated that knowledge about team members adds to performance, 
over and above the contribution of operational skills. 
3.2 Study 2 
In this simulated naval threat scenario, familiar teams outperformed unfamiliar teams 
on all outcome measures: higher mission success, higher accuracy, and shorter response 
latencies.  
The familiar teams were more aroused (heart rate per minute) during low workload. 
During recovery, only familiar teams showed a decrease in arousal. 
Within the sub-teams (vessels), familiar teams increased their global anticipation 
ratio from low to high workload, while the unfamiliar teams showed no differences. 
Unfamiliar teams decreased their monitoring behavior (non-verbal) from low to high 
workload and were more involved in task-irrelevant communication.  
Investigating the communication between the vessels (distributed teams), familiar 
teams increased statements per minute and the number of transfers from low to high 
workload. Familiar teams increased transfers from low to high workload. 
This study demonstrated that knowledge about team members (familiar teams) adds 
to performance, both when teams are separated and within teams. In both conditions, they 
were working towards a common goal and in a situation that was new to all participants 
(simulation facilities). 
3.3 Study 3 
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Teams were exposed to the same unknown simulator and naval scenarios in their 
cross-training (1-3) and high fidelity simulation exercise. Familiar teams performed 
significantly better, hitting more targets than unfamiliar teams in cross-training sessions 2 
and 3 and in the high fidelity simulation. Unfamiliar teams were on a par with familiar teams 
in the first cross-training session, but did not improve (learn) through cross-training sessions 
(2, 3) as the familiar teams did.  
Only familiar teams showed a decrease in physiological arousal (heart rate per 
minute) through cross-training sessions, high fidelity simulation, and recovery. 
Facing a situation unknown to all participants, familiar teams were more explicit, 
engaging in more information exchange (statements per minute) as well as more closed loop 
communication (confirmation). Only familiar teams decreased their closed loop 
communication (confirmation) during cross-training. 
The familiar teams showed more process behavior, indicating higher adaptability 
(updates) and backup behavior (unsolicited help) during cross-training and in the high 
fidelity simulation. No differences were observed for mutual performance monitoring 
behavior (verbal or non-verbal).  
This study demonstrated that knowledge about team members transfers to new tasks 
and situations and results in better coordination, improved efficiency, and less physiological 
arousal.  
4. General discussion 
The findings of these three studies indicate that familiar teams used coordination 
strategies that enhanced efficiency. The coordination strategies used by familiar teams are 
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characterized by less overt communication (statements per minute) during high workload 
(Study 1), a higher global anticipation rate (Study 2), and more adaptability and backup 
statements during cross-training (Study 3). In addition, familiar teams showed more overt 
communication (e.g., confirmation) when confronted with a novel situation (Studies 2 and 
3). Familiar teams outperformed unfamiliar teams, being more accurate and quicker, and 
achieving greater mission success (i.e. more hits). Familiar teams were more physiologically 
aroused (HR) during low workload (Study 2) and less during high workload (Study 1), 
recovery (Studies 2 and 3), decreasingly so during training (Study 3).  
These three studies extend previous research by presenting new empirical data on the 
significance of shared mental models of team members. It is assumed that shared mental 
models of team members enabled the familiar teams to anticipate each others’ future 
behavior and thereby tailor their own behavior accordingly (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993).  
Thus, shared mental models allow team members to adapt better to the environment, 
including to task demands and their fellow team members. All outcome measures indicate 
greater efficiency in the familiar teams, even when confronted with new and unfamiliar 
situations. It is reasonable to assume that these results are a result of a better shared mental 
model of team members in familiar teams than in unfamiliar teams.  In order to explain how 
these results were achieved, it is necessary to evaluate the processes that might have 
contributed to the observed outcomes. Attributes of team cognition can be inferred by 
measuring team processes and behaviors (Cooke et al., 2004).  Hence, when familiar teams 
outperform unfamiliar teams, show more processes, and behaviors related to the SMM 
concept (e.g., backup behavior and anticipation ratio), this will indicate the presence and 
effect of shared mental models of team members. The essentials of shared mental models are 
the switch in communication strategy from explicit closed loop communication to implicit 
communication, while maintaining high levels of performance (Entin & Serfaty, 1999). This 
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shift in communication strategies in response to changing workload condition is seen as an 
indicator of a shared mental model (Salas et al., 2007). The following were anticipated as 
inferred implicit communication and taken as indications of a shared mental model: less 
communication (Duncan et al., 1996; MacMillan, Entin, & Serfaty, 2004), fewer requests, 
more transfers, a higher global anticipation rate (Entin & Serfaty, 1999), more closed loop 
communication in novel situations (Kanki, Lozito, & Foushee, 1989; Orasanu & Salas, 
1993) monitoring behavior, backup behavior, and adaptability (Salas et al., 2005; 2007). 
4.1 Implicit communication inferred to be shared mental model of team 
members 
At the core of the SMM approach is the assumption of implicit coordination. The 
need for explicit coordination of information exchange will thus be lower in teams with a 
highly developed shared mental model (Salas et al., 2007; Duncan et al., 1996; Kleinman & 
Serfaty, 1989). In Study 1, the less exchange of information seen in the familiar team is a 
strong indication of a more developed shared mental model of team members. This argument 
is reasonably valid since all teams had similar operational shared mental models (equipment, 
task and roles).  
Familiar teams in Study 1 also made fewer requests and thus coordinated their 
activity differently and more implicitly than unfamiliar teams. Orasanu (1990) showed that 
successful teams responded to high workload by leaders reducing requests. This is in line 
with Urban et al. (1995), who claimed in a study of hierarchical and non-hierarchical teams 
that efficient teams are characterized by minimal use of question-answer sequences.  The 
finding of fewer requests in Study 1 is in accordance with Aim 1 and supports the notion that 
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superior coordination and results are explained by a more developed shared mental model of 
team-members.  
Further analysis of the information exchange within the attack teams in Study 1 
revealed an interesting pattern, namely that more information was exchanged between the 
commanding officer (CO) and the 2iC in the unfamiliar teams. There was also more 
information exchange from the 2iC to the CO in the unknown teams. This is further evidence 
for the notion that the information structure in the unfamiliar team was distorted and was 
characterized by a need to control each others’ needs, intentions, and actions. The CO and 
the 2iC were the team members who made most of the decisions. Thus, the lack of a shared 
mental model of team members results in an increase in the need for explicit coordination 
among the senior decision-makers in the expert teams. This implies that shared mental 
models of team members enable an expert team to be more implicit in their coordination.  
This is understood to be a vital finding, and the general advantage a team of experts has from 
having a shared mental model (equipment, task, interaction) is hampered if a shared mental 
model of team members is lacking. This indicates that shared mental models of team 
members influence shared mental models of equipment, tasks and interaction. Mathieu et al., 
(2005, 2010) support this, providing evidence for the hypothesis that shared mental models 
of tasks and interaction mediated each other.  
 Orasanu (1990) showed that airline pilots used low workload periods to develop 
shared mental models. This made it possible for them to employ different communication 
strategies during high workload, thus enabling them to communicate more implicitly. The 
change of communication strategy that took place within the familiar teams in Study 2 when 
they went from the low to the high workload phase is a strong indication of shared mental 
models in action. Entin and Serfaty (1999) suggest that an increase in the global anticipation 
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rate (total transfers/total requests) is a strong indication that a team switches its 
communication from explicit to implicit and that this change shows that shared mental 
models are operating. In Study 2, unfamiliar teams responded to the high workload without 
changing communication strategy, which is understood as meaning that there was no 
difference in terms of transfers of and requests for information. On the other hand, familiar 
teams increased the global anticipation rate by switching from pulling (requesting) to 
pushing (transferring) information when in the high-workload condition. Entin and Serfaty 
(1999) contend that an increase in the global anticipation rate as shown by familiar teams in 
Study 2 is a strong indication of shared mental models operating and evidence that shared 
mental models of team members contribute to better performance and efficiency (see Aim 1, 
p. 26).  
Another indication of shared mental models is proposed by Salas et al. (2005). They 
suggested a strong connection between monitoring behavior and shared mental models. They 
proposed that mutual performance monitoring only occurs in teams with an adequate shared 
mental model. Thus, the decrease in monitoring behavior shown by the unfamiliar teams in 
Study 2 indicates a lack of an adequate shared mental model of team members and thereby 
that team members engage less in behavior such as identifying mistakes, providing feedback 
and helping team members with a heavier workload than themselves. This could have a 
detrimental effect on the effectiveness of the team. It is reasonable to assume that, when 
unfamiliar teams engaged in more task-irrelevant communication during high workload, they 
were less able to understand that other team members were uncertain and needed help 
(Kanki & Foushee, 1989).   
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) underlined that, in tasks that are relatively procedure-
based (i.e., the response to various task contingencies can be specified), the importance of  a 
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shared mental model of team members is diminished because the task involves relatively 
little behavioral discretion. Submarine attack teams operate under a strict regime that leaves 
little behavioral discretion outside the procedures laid down in the operation order and 
communication rules. Thus, the attack teams in Study 1 have all the characteristics that are 
suggested as (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993) reducing the importance and impact of shared 
mental models of team members. The findings of Study 1 indicate the presence of shared 
mental models of team members through superior performance and the implicit 
communication strategies associated with the concept. Study 1 thus shows the opposite, 
namely superior performance and efficiency in an environment with low behavioral 
discretion.  Taken together, this is sound evidence for and confirmation of the impact of 
shared mental models of team members on expert teams and is in accordance with Aim 1. 
Study 2 (within vessels) replicated and supported the findings of Study 1, with superior 
efficiency and implicit communication strategies. Hence, taken together and seen in relation 
to the first aim of this thesis (see Aim 1, p. 26), these findings provide strong support for the 
notion that shared mental models of team members have an added value in terms of team 
performance and efficiency.  
4.2 No clues – distributed coordination 
There has been increasing focus on coordination in distributed teams (DeChurch & 
Mathieu, 2009). This is particularly important when teams are physiologically separated, 
have fewer opportunities to coordinate through monitoring behavior, and are exposed to an 
increased level of abstraction, ambiguity, and what Fiore, Salas, Cuevas and Bowers (2003) 
call team opacity. In these situations, Fiore et al. (2003) propose a decrease in team 
members’ situation awareness due to the absence of paralinguistic, non-verbal, and other 
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sensory cues. This may imply that shared mental models of team members’ team 
coordination will be hampered by physical separation.  
The coordination strategy that familiar teams use between vessels in Study 2 implies 
that, in accordance with Aim 2, shared mental models of team members contribute even if 
there is no face-to-face contact between the two sub-teams (vessels). Although differences in 
communication pattern were not prevalent between the two vessels (distributed teams), there 
were indications that familiar teams engaged in more implicit communication. This 
argument is based on an increase in the frequency of transfers of information from low to 
high workload condition. This is especially interesting since unfamiliar teams showed no 
such increase. This indicates that familiar teams verged on being more implicit in their 
communication.  This further strengthens the notion that shared mental models of team 
members also have an impact in distributed teams (see Aim 2, p. 26). 
Contrary to what was expected, familiar teams in the distributed condition (between 
vessels) in Study 2 increased the number of statements per minute from low to high 
workload compared to unfamiliar teams. One explanation could be that familiar teams 
adjusted their communication based on what Salas et al. (2005) describe as the ability to 
identify changes in the team, task or team-mates, and to implicitly adjust strategies as 
needed. Hence, the team members were not experts on the subject matter, but used their 
shared mental models of each other to be able to sense that other team members were 
struggling and needed help (e.g., information).  If this is correct, it implies that novices in 
relation to a task use their familiarity to enhance communication, to be more implicit by 
pushing information (more transfers), to keep the distributed other team members up to 
speed in relation to a new and unfamiliar situation. Familiar teams thereby seem to monitor 
each other more efficiently through verbal clues, such as a tone of voice indicating that help 
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is needed, and act accordingly. The last argument is supported by the differences in transfer; 
familiar teams initiated more unsolicited communications during high workload than 
unfamiliar teams. Familiar teams may thereby have been more able to anticipate that the 
other teams (vessels) needed to share information or have something done, and acted 
accordingly. This indicates a learning strategy that is adaptable to a new situation when the 
team consists of novices in relation to the subject matter and is only connected through 
verbal clues. This will be further elaborated when novel situations in connection with Study 
3 are discussed. Unfortunately, it is not possible, based on Study 2, to know how task experts 
would have coordinated when separated physically. But when novices are on the verge on 
being implicit, this is a strong indication that task experts will increase their global 
anticipation ratio when in a distributed situation. Thus, with reference to our second research 
aim (Aim 2, p. 26), there seem to be strong indications that a shared mental model of team 
members improves performance and efficiency when teams are separated physically. 
 
4.3 Do shared mental models of team members improve learning? 
Study 3 addressed how shared mental models of team members would influence team 
performance and adaptation to a radically changed context represented by cross-training and 
a high fidelity simulation exercise (Aim 3, p. 27). Cross-training refers to a strategy in which 
each member is trained in the specific tasks, duties, and responsibilities of his or her fellow 
team members (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; McCann, Baranski, Thompson, Pigeau 
2000, Marks et al., 2002). There appear to be few previous studies that have assessed 
differences in the outcomes of shared mental models of team members when team members 
 58
are confronted with a series of new and unfamiliar training sessions represented by cross-
training and a high fidelity simulation exercise.  
  Mainly in Study 3 but also in Study 2, the difficulties of understanding the situation 
and task may initially have prompted more explicit communication. Since the situation in 
Study 3 was new and unknown to the team members, the familiar teams were, as expected, 
more explicit in their initial communication. This is explained by a need to make sure that 
each team member received proper information. Through more communication (statements 
per minute) and more closed loop communication (confirmations), each team member 
ensured that every aspect of the situation was received and understood (Kanki et al., 1989; 
Orasanu & Salas, 1993). Thus, in contrast to the less successful unfamiliar teams, the 
familiar teams seemed to develop and update their shared mental models (equipment, task, 
interaction) while they were engaged in problem-solving and task work during the initial 
training scenarios (Bowers, Jentsch, Salas, & Braun, 1998). When, unlike the unfamiliar 
teams, the familiar teams decreased their closed loop communication as the cross-training 
progressed, it is reasonable to assume that the initial strategy was no longer necessary as 
knowledge about the task increased (Entin & Serfaty, 1999).  This is supported by the 
efficiency measures. During the first cross-training session, there were no differences (hits 
on target) between familiar and unfamiliar teams, but only familiar teams improved (learned) 
during the next training sessions. This was expected and strengthens the assumption that the 
shared mental models of team members enhance learning through superior coordination 
strategies (Aim 3, p. 27). 
In line with the logic of shared mental models, all teams will increase their shared 
mental model of equipment, the task and interrelations and move towards more implicit 
communication as the cross-training progresses. Salas et al. (2005) proposed a strong 
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connection between adaptability, backup and mutual performance monitoring behavior and 
shared mental models. They proposed that mutual performance monitoring, backup behavior 
and adaptability occur more often in teams with adequate shared mental models.  This is 
supported by Study 3, where the findings indicated that familiar teams showed a higher 
frequency of adaptability and backup behavior.   
There were no differences in mutual performance monitoring (verbal or non-verbal) 
in Study 3. One explanation could be that the heavy workload reduced team members’ 
opportunities to watch other team members due to time constraints. It is also possible that 
familiar teams monitored each other more efficiently through verbal clues, such as a tone of 
voice indicating that help was needed, and acted accordingly (e.g., offering action, which 
was significantly higher for the familiar teams). The ability to draw on knowledge of each 
team member’s tone of voice is supported by the findings from Study 2, where physically 
separated teams seemed to be able to coordinate implicitly (increased transfer).  The 
differences in adaptability, whereby familiar teams initiated more updates (adaptability) and 
unsolicited help (backup, information, action, problem-solving), strengthen this assumption. 
They thus anticipated that the team needed to share information or have something done, and 
acted accordingly. This may be the most important difference relating to the availability of 
shared mental models. Taken together with the finding that familiar teams showed a higher 
rate of confirmations in order to keep everybody in the team up to date with the evolving 
situation, it seems that a shared mental model of team members in the familiar teams 
contributes to a coordination strategy that is superior to that of unfamiliar teams.  
Study 3 shows that the shared mental model of team members is a mechanism that 
improves coordination, as evidenced by better communication strategies, and results in 
enhanced adaptation (learning) to a new task and situation, as demonstrated by improved 
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performance and outcomes in high workload conditions. Thus, this provides strong support 
for the suggestion that shared mental models of team members are transferable across 
different tasks (see Aim 3, p. 27).  
4.4 Transactive memory systems 
The second part of the third aim was to examine whether TMS and the shared mental 
model of team members were distinctly different concepts. Research based on the TMS 
approach has concentrated on knowledge about the task the team is meant to solve and the 
team’s ability to draw on team members’ different memories of it (task knowledge) 
(Mohammed et al., 2010). Thus, since participants in Study 3 encountered a novel situation 
and task, it is difficult to attribute differences in performance between familiar and 
unfamiliar teams to TMS.  
 Only familiar teams improved efficiency (i.e., hits on target) after one cross-training 
session, while unfamiliar teams did not. Since the observed communication indicated 
coordination strategies that are inferred from the SMM concept (closed loop, adaptive and, 
backup behavior), this is strong evidence for the assumption that the shared mental model of 
team members caused the observed better performance by familiar teams, and not TMS.  
The better performance by familiar teams in Study 3 is a strong indication that the 
shared mental model of team members is distinct and different from TMS, having an 
independent and added value in relation to the coordination processes that explains the 
superior efficiency of the familiar teams in cross-training sessions 2 and 3 and the high 
fidelity simulation (Aim 3, p. 27). 
The TMS perspective underlines the importance, in relation to being able to perform 
the overall task, of distributed knowledge  of team members’ skills and knowledge, but it 
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does not add to performance when the workload is high, interdependence between roles are 
high, the situation is new, time is limited, and coordination is crucial. In such cases, the cost 
of distributed knowledge is the possibility that performance will be hampered (Kozlowski & 
Ilgen, 2006). This thesis has shown that there is more to familiarity in the team cognition 
domain than awareness of who knows what about the task at hand. A shared mental model of 
team members seems to be distinctly different from TMS and appears to add value to 
coordination in teamwork (Aim 3, p 27).  
4.5 Physiological arousal 
An extensive literature search indicates that no studies have combined physiology 
with the SMM approach. This is somewhat surprising since several authors (Kleinman & 
Serfaty, 1989; Orasanu & Salas, 1993; Salas et al., 2005) underline that the importance of 
shared mental models as a coordinating mechanism increases in teams that have to perform 
under stressful conditions. In the three studies, Heart Rate (HR) was used as a manipulation 
check of high workload. Heart Rate is often used as a measure of a stress response 
(Kudielka, Buske, Kirschbaum, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 2004). Schommer, 
Hellhammer and Kirschbaum (2004) have found a decrease in HR during stress response 
over time. Hence, it is possible that a shared mental model of team members decreases HR 
in high workload situations. Study 1 supports the importance of this assumption. It also 
shows that, in addition to better performance, teams that are expert in subject matter and 
have a shared mental model of team members show increased stress resilience. This is based 
on the finding that only the unfamiliar teams showed a significant increase in HR from low 
to high intensity scenarios.  Viewed together with more implicit coordination and more hits 
on target, this finding provides solid evidence for the notion that a shared mental model of 
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team members adds to teamwork over and above the contribution of operational knowledge 
and skills (see Aim 1, p. 26).  
Contrary to what was expected, familiar teams in Studies 2 and 3 were not less 
physiologically aroused (HR) than unfamiliar teams during high workload conditions, as was 
the case in Study 1. In Study 2, the situation and task were unknown (not experts in the 
subject matter as in Study 1), and one explanation could be that the novelty of the situation 
itself affected and thus mediated physiological arousal. A control group of subject matter 
experts would have made it possible to check this. In Study 3, the novelty of the situation 
and the cross-training itself could have had the same effect on arousal. In Study 3, however, 
the familiar teams decreased their HR from the first cross-training to the high intensity 
simulation. This indicates that familiar teams developed resilience towards higher workloads 
compared to unfamiliar teams. The faster learning by familiar teams as shown by better 
performance (i.e., improved number of hits) strengthens this notion. A control group not 
participating in the cross-training would have enabled us to establish this.  
Looking at HR patterns over all conditions in Studies 2 and 3, differences emerged 
between familiar and unfamiliar teams. In Study 2, familiar teams increased their HR 
significantly from baseline to low workload. Recovery of HR in Studies 2 and 3 was only 
found in the familiar teams, indicating higher adaptability of the organism to environmental 
demands.   
This ability to regulate physiological activity is associated with Situational 
Awareness (SA). Saus, Johnsen, Eid, Riisem, Andersen and Thayer (2006), for instance, 
reported an association between Heart Rate Variability (HRV) and SA measured during the 
recovery phase. Furthermore, Saus et al. (submitted) have shown that naval cadets who 
displayed a high degree of SA in a navigation simulator were also able to modulate their 
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internal environment in order to match external demands. This was found with suppression 
of HRV from baseline to simulation and a recovery effect. In contrast, in the low SA group, 
there was no differentiation of HRV from rest to simulation and recovery.  
This indicates that familiar teams, initially and over time, display a more adaptive 
and resilient response to change in the environment (e. g., higher workload) compared to 
unfamiliar teams. This is understood as increased sensitivity to external demands and a key 
element of the importance of a shared mental model of team members.  
4.6  Shared mental models of team members make a difference  
Study 1 demonstrated that knowledge about team members (i.e., a shared mental model 
of team members) adds to performance over and above the contribution of operational skills 
(Aim 1). Study 2 confirmed Study 1 (within teams) and provided empirical evidence for the 
effect of shared mental models of team members in distributed teams (Aim 2). The findings 
in Study 3 suggest that shared mental models of team members are transferable across tasks 
and enhance the effects of cross-training (Aim 3). All studies extend previous research, but 
Study 3 in particular indicates that a shared mental model of team members is distinctly 
different from a transactive memory system (Aim 3). Hence, a shared mental model of team 
members represents an independent, adaptive asset at team level that enhances team 
performance, efficiency, and resilience.  
These studies are the first to provide empirical evidence that supports the notion that a 
shared mental model of team members is a mechanism that improves efficiency and 
coordination in teams. It thus expands previous knowledge, where the focus has been on 
equipment, tasks and team interaction. The findings represent a contribution to and fill a 
vital gap in the Shared Mental Model literature.  
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The findings from these three studies are strong indications that a shared mental model 
of team members contributes to resilience and coping. The superior performance and 
efficiency shown by familiar teams in all three studies supports this proposition. A shared 
mental model of team members seems to enable the team to choose coordination strategies 
that fit the team and the situation. A model is therefore proposed to put the findings into a 
context that shows how shared mental models of team members seem to operate.  
4.7 The ShipMate Model 
 One way of understanding the findings is to look at what can happen when a team 
member becomes aware of a change in the environment (outer world). The other team 
members sense a change in his/her behavior –“something has happened” – (e.g., the team 
member appears to be more concentrated, uncertain). This is in line with the proposed 
property of shared mental models that they enable the team to identify changes in the team 
and in team-mates (Salas et al., 2005). This suggests that a shared mental model of team 
members enhances a team’s sensitivity to change, enabling it to act accordingly (see Figure 
2). 
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Figure 2: The ShipMate mode: The symbols S1/S2/S3 are understood as findings from Study 1, 
Study 2 and study 3. The logic is explained to be that when a change takes place in the outer world this is 
sensed (discovered) by on or two members in the team. Then the teams choose three different ways to 
coordinate based on what knowledge and skill they have on own task, if they are separated, or face a novel 
situation. This then give better outcomes (e.g., more hits).  
4.7.1 Sensitivity 
The ability to detect deviancies, shortcomings, and unfamiliarity in members of the team 
was enhanced in familiar teams, and they focused on rectifying the situation. As a result, 
familiar teams put more effort into understanding and coping, even in situations where there 
was no immediate need for action (e.g., low workload). This, in turn, could result in an 
immediate increase in the observed heart rate during low workload in Study 2 and initial 
cross-training in Study 3. This could also help to explain why familiar teams performed 
better than unfamiliar teams in Study 2 during low workload. Another argument in this 
connection is provided by the finding made when looking at heart rate during recovery, 
where only familiar teams in Studies 2 and 3 decreased their heart rates, indicating higher 
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sensitivity and thereby adaptability of the organism to environmental demands. (Saus et al., 
2006)  
  Increased sensibility in familiar teams has at least two implications. First, the whole 
team implicitly shares within the team that a change has occurred, and they therefore 
become aware of changes more quickly and can cope with the reality of the change in the 
environment. Less irrelevant communication by the familiar teams in Study 2 can be 
understood as better awareness and, consequently, a more appropriate strategy and an 
indication of a shared mental model of team members. 
Second, familiar teams are able to adjust implicitly to the coordinating strategy that 
best fits the situation and the team. The second implication is in line with the theoretical 
framework for shared mental models, where Salas et al. (2005) define the ability to 
implicitly anticipate what your team-mates need and, accordingly, what (i.e., information, 
action) they need from you.  Thus, a shared mental model of team members enables the team 
to choose the coordination strategy that is best suited to coping with the situation and/or to 
the abilities of the team. These three studies indicate that the (implicit) choice of 
coordination strategy depends on three factors/questions: do we know the task, are we 
separated from other team members, and are we facing a novel situation (a learning 
situation)?  
4.7.2 Task knowledge coordination 
If the team knows the task (are subject matter experts), as was the case in Study 1, 
then the coordination seems to be straightforward and in accordance with the original 
theoretical framework for shared mental models. The teams have a general shared mental 
model (of equipment, task, interaction, and team members) and are able to immediately start 
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communicating implicitly. The appropriate coordination is “less is more”, i.e., less 
communication (statements per minute) and less control (requests). 
When facing a task they are not experts in, as was the case in Study 2 (within teams), 
teams are forced to communicate more in order to learn the new elements in the task they as 
a team must adapt to. In such cases, familiar teams implicitly know that team-mates need 
more information and thus start to push it or display what Entin and Serfaty (1999) call a 
higher global anticipation ratio to meet high workload. Thus, a shared mental model of team 
members enables them to choose a coordination strategy that can be characterized as “more 
is less”, i.e., more transfer, task-oriented communication and monitoring (non-verbal).   
4.7.3 Distributed coordination 
When teams are separated physically, this puts even more strain on the coordination 
process. The solution to the obstacle to communication seems to be implicitly understood by 
familiar teams. Study 2 indicates that, given physical separation, the strategy for familiar 
teams seems to be “more is less”. As was the case within the teams in Study 2, a shared 
mental model of team members enables familiar teams to push information, increase the 
number of transfers and, contrary to within teams on the same vessel, enhance the overall 
communication strategy by communicating more when the workload increases.  
4.7.4 Coordination in novel situations 
When teams that have a shared mental model of team members (Study 3) face a 
novel situation, they implicitly understand there is a need to learn, and they act accordingly. 
(“we do not know and have to learn - together”). In such situations, teams that have a shared 
mental model of team members have two parallel communication strategies. Initially, when 
the uncertainty is greatest, it is crucial to create a common understanding of the 
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surroundings. Hence, they adjust (implicitly) and become more explicit, make more 
statements per minute and use closed loop communication to develop a shared mental model 
of the equipment, task and interaction. The need to be explicit is reduced as the team learns 
the task. The second strategy seems to be to dynamically allocate task-relevant resources to 
team members to take care of workload distribution problems by giving more backup and 
engaging in adaptive behavior.   
4.7.5 Outcomes 
 The Shipmate Model suggests that familiar teams approach a dynamic environment 
differently from unfamiliar teams. First, familiar teams seem to be more attentive (higher 
heart rate during low workload in Studies 2 and 3), more resilient (lower heart rate during 
high workload in Study 1), and adaptive (decreasing heart rate during cross-training sessions 
in Study 3 and recovery in Studies 2 and 3).  A shared mental model of team members seems 
to enable familiar teams to act more quickly and more thoroughly and to achieve greater 
mission success (e.g., more hits).   
4.8 Limitations and weaknesses 
Despite the possible contribution of the present thesis, several potential limitations 
should be noted.  
 
 
4.8.1 Design of the studies 
Studies 2 and 3 can be considered experiments since the cadets were randomly assigned to 
groups, even though they were not randomly sampled from a population. Study 1 comprised 
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the total submarine crew population of the Norwegian Royal Navy. Generalizing the 
findings to other kinds of personnel or types of teams involves several complications. First, 
the participants are selected Norwegian, military personnel and caution should be displayed 
when generalizing these findings to other cultures and a more diverse group of people. The 
type of teams is also distinct, but it is reasonable to expect that the findings apply to teams 
that consist of domain experts with interdependent tasks working towards a common goal in 
a high workload environment. However, Yang, Kang, & Mason (2008) among others (e.g., 
Kellermanns, Floyd, Pearson, & Spencer, 2008) have shown that other type of teams (e.g., 
project teams, software development teams, university teams) benefit from knowledge about 
the SMM concept in general. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that other types of teams 
will experience similar effects of shared mental models of team members.  
4.8.2 Control variables 
Other possible limitations not controlled for in the present thesis are learning effects, 
trust, cohesion, self-efficacy, and motivation.    
First, the results could have been influenced by learning effects. In Study 1, the runs 
were administered in balanced order to meet this challenge. In Studies 2 and 3, however, the 
experience of being a cadet for a year at the Royal Naval Academy may have resulted in 
more knowledge about how to cooperate in teams. Thus, a group of four teams of older 
cadets (third year) was put together. A 2x2 ANOVA showed no differences between third-
year cadets and first-year cadets in the unfamiliar group on any dependent variable. This 
suggests that learning effects did not explain the results obtained.  
Furthermore, the literature shows that increasing attention is being devoted to trust as 
a precursor of team performance (Bandow, 2001). However, trust may have been present in 
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both the familiar and unfamiliar teams in Study 2. This is based on Bandow (2001), who 
states that 12 to 18 hours of face-to-face contact is required to instill the appropriate trust in 
a team. When the unfamiliar teams started Studies 2 and 3, they came straight from the 
introduction week at the Royal Norwegian Naval academy. This week is an intensive team-
building period involving extensive face-to-face interaction with the aim of instilling trust in 
the naval cadets. It is reasonable to expect that they were confident in each other and that the 
differences found in the present studies can be attributed to shared mental models of team 
members and not to the level of trust.  This is further supported by another study of cadets 
from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. According to Nissestad (2007), there were no 
differences after the first week and after the first year in terms of group climate or group 
dynamics in the teams. He also showed that cadets are a homogeneous group, referring to 
personality factors measured by the NEO-PI. The Nissestad study was conducted on five 
cohorts between 2001 and 2005, and it is reasonable to expect that this would also apply to 
the participants in the present studies. Concepts such as self-efficacy and cohesion could 
also have biased the findings in Studies 2 and 3. However, as these phenomena were not 
explicitly controlled for, they could have influenced the result of the present study. Not 
measuring the cohorts in Studies 2 and 3 and the officers in Study 1 could possibly be a 
limitation on the findings.  
Moreover, there may be differences in the level of motivation between the different 
groups that could have influenced performance and efficiency. Studies 2 and 3 were 
conducted as a part of an exercise in the leadership program for cadets. The participants 
were told that the best team would take the lead in the next period, which they actually did. 
This probably increased motivation in all the teams. One indication that supports this notion 
is the low number of communications unrelated to the task observed in Study 3 and, more 
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importantly, the fact that there were no differences between familiar or unfamiliar teams. 
Motivation may still differ between familiar and unfamiliar teams, however.  
4.8.3 Measurement challenges 
Another possible weakness that has to be taken into consideration when interpreting and 
discussing the findings is the challenge relating to measurement. This thesis was based on 
inferring from team members’ behaviors the presence of a shared mental model of team 
members. Systematic observation of behavior of this kind can provide insight into cognition 
and, in particular, mechanistic theories of cognition (e.g., shared mental models; Cooke et al. 
2004). Mohammed et al. (2010) recommend that researchers move from referring to shared 
mental models in the abstract to specifying content domain and property. However, they also 
underline the diversity, complexity, and number of measurement methods (Mohammed et 
al., 2010). In the same vein, they concur that shared mental models of team members have 
been a greater empirical challenge relative to shared mental models of task, equipment and 
interaction, which by their nature tend to be more straightforward to assess. Another related 
problem is the operationalization and definition of shared mental models as a construct. 
Shared mental models of teams members are largely unexamined and broadly (unclear) 
defined (Salas & Fiore, 2004). This thesis has provided empirical support for the hypothesis 
that it is an important determinant of team functioning and team performance, but it does not 
provide a more firm and robust definition or operationalization of what shared mental 
models of team members are than the one already proposed (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993).  
Thus, a proposal for future research in this field would be to examine the nature of the 
mental models each team member has of each other, and to subsequently investigate whether 
they are shared in successful teams.  
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4.8.4 Future research 
The proposed enhanced performance during uncertain high workload situations is at the 
core of the SMM approach. The next step might therefore be to investigate how team 
members perceive each others’ behavior during uncertainty and high workload. One way of 
addressing this is to use facial recognition (Ekman & Friesen, 2003) and voice interpretation 
(Busso & Narayanan, 2007) in teams. It is proposed to investigate a possible shared 
awareness and ability to understand how own team members express emotions by facial 
expression and/or tone of voice (i.e., aggression caused by uncertainty) during high 
workload. This would make it possible to confirm and elaborate on the findings of this 
thesis. More importantly, however, this would have a potential to narrow down the present 
definition of a shared mental model of team members (i.e., knowledge, preferences, 
tendencies, abilities) that can be understood as a broad concept.   
4.9 Implications 
This thesis concludes that teams that have a shared mental model of team members 
display superior coordination and efficiency. This indicates that a shared mental model of 
team members plays an important role in team functioning and performance. The taxonomy 
(shared mental model of equipment, task, interaction, and team) proposed by Cannon-
Bowers et al. (1993) has not been empirically validated (Salas 2009), and, more specifically, 
this thesis indicates that a shared mental model of team members is a vital contribution to 
team performance in expert or novice teams (Aim 1), distributed teams (Aim 2), and teams 
facing a novel situation (Aim 3). It also concludes that the concept is distinctly different 
from TMS. This thesis thereby confirms that a shared mental model of team members is an 
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important and independent concept with an added value in relation to team performance and 
efficiency.   
4.9.1 Transactive memory systems 
As a valid training strategy relating to TMS, Moreland et al. (1999) propose to 
simply state (give) each team member’s individual knowledge and skills about the task 
ahead before the team is supposed to execute a task. While it is important in terms of 
enhancing performance, TMS is no more than a personification of ordinary task work or 
stating what expertise each member has. This line of thinking implies that team members 
understand each other as more or less skilful or knowledgeable in their own tasks, as tools, 
not a human beings. If the operating theater is used as an example, each team member is an 
expert (in his or her own task) and everybody knows this or else they would not be allowed 
to cut open or sedate the patient. But the findings of all these three studies question whether 
the coordination between team members is distorted by the fact that they do not know each 
other as human beings. The TMS perspective offers no solution besides better procedures 
and expertise, which, while important in itself, is not the entire answer. The TMS 
perspective underlines the importance, in relation to performing the overall task, of 
distributed knowledge of team members’ skills and knowledge, but it does not add to 
performance when the workload is high, interdependence between roles is high, the situation 
is new, time is limited, and coordination is crucial. The cost of distributed knowledge may 
be that it hampers performance (Kozlowski & Ilgen 2006). Study 3 shows that a shared 
mental model of team members enables familiar teams to adapt to and learn a changing 
situation more quickly and more accurately. Thus, if an organization relies exclusively on 
distributed knowledge in accordance with the TMS perspective, teams will need more time 
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to obtain new knowledge and skills or to adapt to a new situation than teams with a shared 
mental model of team members.  
4.9.2 Staffing 
The findings in this thesis have implications for the rotation of personnel in expert 
teams. Mastery of rules, procedures, and skills is not enough for high performance by a 
team. Personnel need to develop a shared mental model of the other team members. Keeping 
teams intact during training and operations could be a way of achieving this.  
Consequently, there are implications for staffing. The findings indicate a policy of 
promoting stable team membership. When the question of replacing a team member arises, 
one solution could be to choose between potential candidates based on their familiarity with 
the team in question. Training (e.g., a simulator) should also be conducted collectively as a 
team prior to actual performance, and not individually as is the case in many organizations. 
4.9.3 Safety 
It is obvious that it is almost impossible to avoid rotation. Unfamiliarity will 
therefore always be present to a greater or lesser extent. But the findings can contribute to a 
higher level of safety. This thesis indicates that organizations should avoid putting together 
unfamiliar teams in situations where a possible novel and critical situation may occur before 
they have had time to operate together for some time. If this is impossible, one 
recommendation would be to use the first occasion on which they are assembled to obtain 
vital information about each other and to spread it throughout the team. The findings 
indicate that a shared mental model of team members enhances a team’s sensitivity to 
change (ref. the proposed Shipmate model). A crucial issue for a newly formed team to 
attend to would therefore seem to be to increase and share awareness of how each team 
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member reacts to a high workload and uncertainty. Second, knowing when to use closed 
loop communication will be crucial in relation to making sure that everybody understands 
and learns as a situation unfolds and develops. Similarly, each team member must 
understand and engage in behavior such as mutual performance monitoring, backup, and 
adaptability. By following the logic of Salas et al. (2005) and the findings of this thesis, a 
newly formed team will be able to learn more quickly and adapt better to high workload 
situations.  
5. Conclusion 
The scope of the present thesis was to investigate whether and how familiarity 
influences coordination, resilience, and efficiency in high performance teams in safety-
critical organizations.  
The findings from these three studies suggest that a shared mental model of team 
members is a mechanism that improves efficiency, resilience, and coordination in teams.  
Study 1 demonstrated that knowledge about team members (i.e. a shared mental model of 
the team members) adds to performance (implicit communication), efficiency (more hits), 
and resilience (lower HR) over and above the contribution of operational skills. Study 2 
provided empirical evidence for the effect of a shared mental model of team members on 
distributed teams (i.e., global anticipation ratio, mission success). The findings from Study 3, 
suggest that a shared mental model of team members is transferable across tasks and that it 
enhances the effects of cross-training (i.e., more hits, closed loop, adaptability, and backup) 
and are distinctly different from the concept of transactive memory systems.  
This thesis confirms shared mental models of team members as an important and 
independent construct with an added value in relation to team performance and efficiency.  It 
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thereby expands previous knowledge, where the focus has been on equipment, tasks, and 
team interaction. The findings represent a contribution to and fill in a vital gap in the Shared 
Mental Model literature and they have implications for training, staffing, and safety issues 
for teams in safety-critical organizations. 
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In this study submarine attack crews were studied during simulated attack opera-
tions. The aim of the study was to test whether knowledge about team members had
an effect on performance and team processes. The design controlled for skills of the
different operators. Briefly, this study demonstrated that knowledge about team
members adds to performance, over and above the contribution from operational
skills. This was evident for number of hits on target, amount of information ex-
change, and the type of information changed to a more controlling type of interaction
when the attack teams operated. In addition, the data indicated less physiological
arousal in teams with known team members. We attributed this effect to the shared
mental models of team members when the attack teams operated under a condition of
known team members.
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In military organizations critical decisions are made every day by teams of individ-
uals who must coordinate their activities to achieve optimal effectiveness. Deci-
sions are often made under the strain of time pressure, uncertainty, and threat of
fatal consequences. Complex high-tech systems and equipment have been intro-
duced to facilitate meeting the challenges of command and control in operational
environments. One consequence of this increasingly complex man–machine inter-
face is the need to carefully coordinate and synchronize input from individual team
members. Submarines constitute a specialized environment, characterized by
careful selection and training of personnel, highly complex technology, and a
unique organizational culture (Schrier, 1989).
The ultimate challenge for a submarine crew is to function effectively when it
must defend itself and attack enemy vessels. The submarine crew must be able to
operate sophisticated equipment, integrate and exchange vital situational assess-
ments, and execute actions against hostile contacts. Complex decisions must be
made despite high workload, time pressure, uncertainty, and external threat. In ad-
dition salient stressors such as extremely limited work and living space, absence of
day–night cues, confinement, isolation from all interactions with the external
world, monotony in routine, and extended separation from family members consti-
tute internal demands that submarine crews must master.
Research into team effectiveness has shown that effective teams can maintain
performance even under conditions of high workload when communication oppor-
tunities are reduced (Kleiman & Serfaty, 1989). This has been labeled implicit co-
ordination and depends on the teams’ ability to draw on a common understanding
of the task. Several authors have hypothesized that the mechanisms that allow this
type of performance are shared mental models (SMMs; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, &
Converse, 1993). Mental models involve mechanisms that humans use to describe
the purpose and form of a system as well as its functioning in the present and future
state (Rouse & Morris, 1986). Recently, researchers have emphasized the shared
aspects of mental models in expert teams (Driskell & Salas, 1998). SMMs are as-
sumed to enable the team members to predict task needs and actions of other team
members. SMM offers an understanding of how team members coordinate behav-
ior and choose different actions without explicit demands to coordinate (Can-
non-Bowers & Salas, 1998).
The significance of SMMs and team coordination was emphasized in the re-
search project Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS), initiated after
the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian Airbus in 1988. TADMUS is an applied
research program in U.S. Department of Defense parlance. Briefly, the goal of the
TADMUS program was to develop training, simulation, decision support, and dis-
play principles that would help to mitigate the impact of stress on decision making
(Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). The program had a special emphasis on informa-
tion processing and tactical decision making by shipboard command teams in air
defense operations under conditions of short decision times, high operational
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workload, and ambiguous incomplete information. One of the conclusions from
the TADMUS project was the importance of swift and accurate coordination of in-
formation and behavior to successfully cope with the demands of emergency com-
bat situations. This implies the need for team coordination strategies that must be
implicit and automatic (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989). SMMs constitute a core aspect
of a successful coordination of information and behavior in expert teams (Can-
non-Bowers et al., 1993). Highly effective operational teams have multiple SMMs
of different types and levels of complexity that enhance effective coordination and
problem solving. Following the TADMUS project, a number of studies have indi-
cated that SMM may contribute to increased team effectiveness (Volpe, Can-
non-Bowers, Salas, & Spector, 1996).
Another significant outcome from the TADMUS project was its emphasis on
naturalistic decision making (NDM) to study aspects of real-life decision making.
NDM implies a focus on the individual decision maker and the decision process.
Lipshitz and Ben Shaul (1996) stated that a common view in the different NDM
models is the focus on recognition of situations and reflection processes as a con-
tinuous shift between thought and action. The actual situation at hand is compared
to similar situations, actions, and outcomes. The decision maker focuses not on a
particular problem, but uses his or her experience with similar situations to imple-
ment different solutions to a series of problems. The dominating model in NDM is
recognition primed decision making (RPD; Klein, 1998). In RPD an expert deci-
sion maker is believed to make use of previous experience and expertise to detect
familiar elements and information patterns that can be used to assess the situation
and solve the problem at hand.
The TADMUS project also focused on team performance. Team output gives a
good indication of team efficiency. However, team performance is also related to
information sharing, implicit and explicit coordination, and team-member ex-
change to solve operational tasks. In other words, team performance hinges on sev-
eral underlying processes occurring in the team during task executing. The
TADMUS project identified supporting behavior, team initiative, information ex-
change, and communication as significant aspects of team performance
(Smith-Jentsch, Zeisig, Acton, & McPherson, 1998).
Research in the TADMUS project was largely performed on teams operating on
antiair warfare in U.S. Navy vessels (Combat Information Centre Anti-Air War-
fare teams [CiC team]). The environments these teams must master are character-
ized by dependence of team effort, proficiency of specific and shared tasks, and
distinct roles among the team members (see Duncan et al., 1996, for an overview).
Through in-depth interviews, observations, and comparison of errors between ex-
perts and novices in expert teams, a number of core characteristics of SMMs were
extracted. These characteristics of the high-performing, high-SMM teams were
summarized in six hypotheses. First the team members will be more accurate in
predicting the actions of their teammates. Second, team members will require less
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overt planning time to accomplish their mission. Third, teams will spend less time
communicating. Fourth, the frequency of requests to repeat information or ask
why a team member is taking some action will be reduced. Fifth, activities will be
better sequenced, without discussion, because team members will know what and
when to communicate to whom. Finally, teams will be more resilient to stress ef-
fects. Although stressors normally reduce the amount of information flow through
the CiC, thereby limiting the tasks they can perform, an SMM will allow them to
coordinate implicitly using an internal model of the team (Duncan et al., 1996, p.
185).
Orasanu (1990, cited in Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999)
showed that effective aircrews met difficult situations with an increased amount of
unasked information. At the same time the captains reduced requests for informa-
tion. Less effective teams showed the opposite information exchange strategies. In
the TADMUS project, the information exchange strategies used by effective teams
were interpreted as an index of the presence of an SMM in the team. It was stated
that an SMM made it possible for the team to give each other vital information in a
proper and orderly manner without the receiver asking for it. This enabled the team
to focus on the essentials in the task they were facing. Thus the number of times
unsolicited information was offered was seen as a vital confirmation of the pres-
ence of an SMM (Duncan et al., 1996).
An SMM is based on the assumption that the team must be able to simulate fu-
ture events to create good and plausible explanations of future outcomes. To make
this possible, some researchers have suggested that multiple shared models must
be in action at the same time. Rouse and Morris (1986) suggested a taxonomy of
mental models where every level or type of model has different importance de-
pending on which task one wants to solve. Some problems are solved through one
type of mental model, and other problems are solved by integrating several mental
models.
The TADMUS study identified four levels or types of SMM: (a) the equipment,
(b) task at hand, (c) team interaction, and (d) type of team (Cannon-Bowers et al.,
1993). The SMMs related to the equipment, task, and team interaction are particu-
larly emphasized in the TADMUS project. Some empirical studies have focused
on the importance of knowledge about tasks, need of information, and the entire
team (Duncan et al., 1996). The fourth type of SMM is related to knowledge about
individual differences in competencies, skills, abilities, preferences, and tenden-
cies (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1993). In spite of repeated statements of the impor-
tance of SMM of team members, few if any empirical studies of this factor have
been published.
Thus, it is still an open issue if the SMM of the team influences team perfor-
mance and resilience toward stress. This could lead to a hypothesis that both
knowledge about how to act and knowledge about individual team members will
influence team performance and effectiveness. One way to explore the effect of
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an SMM of team members would be to study seasoned and well-established mil-
itary teams, such as submarine attack crews. These teams are relatively small,
well trained, and have a high degree of both operational skill and personal
knowledge. To study team performance in a realistic and true-to-life operational
setting, a full-scale submarine simulator provides several advantages. First, these
simulators are exact copies of operational submarines. Second, simulators offer
several options for monitoring performance and tracking individual performance
over time.
The aim of this study was to investigate whether knowledge about individual
team members would augment the effect of operational skills in predicting opera-
tional effectiveness in trained expert teams. More specifically, would an SMM of
team members add to the performance of the team, over and above that explained
by operational skills? We hypothesized that known team members—those familiar
with one another—would show better performance and less cardiovascular reac-
tivity to a simulated tactical situation compared to unknown team members.
METHOD
Participants
The total population of attack teams on the Norwegian ULA class submarines par-
ticipated in the study. Twenty-four active duty officers composed four attack teams
(six members per team). The officers were ranked from lieutenant commander to
submarine lieutenant. The purpose of the attack team was to discover, classify, and
eventually attack when operating against an imaginary or real enemy.
The participants’ mean age was 26.3 years (range = 24–33) and experience
ranged from 4 to 12 years. All members of the attack teams had worked together as
teams for more than 3 months.
Outcome Variables
Interpositional knowledge. A questionnaire was developed to evaluate op-
erational knowledge in the teams. The questionnaire was based on interpositional
knowledge (IPK; Volpe et al., 1996). This IPK was developed in cooperation with
expert personnel in the submarine service. IPK refers to the amount of knowledge
a team member has of others, their own, and the team’s tasks, roles and proper re-
sponses in different situations. The IPK was divided into two parts. Part 1 deals
with the member’s knowledge about different positions in the attack teams, their
roles, tasks, responsibilities, and duties. Part 2 concerns knowledge about the sys-
tem and what to do given different situations or system status. The IPK consisted
of 17 items. Here is an example of an item: “The submarine has 8 torpedoes on the
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way. Sonar reports comprimated cavitation. What can and should each position in
the attack team contribute in this situation?” The items were scored by expert raters
and given scores from 1 to 3 based on the quality of their answers. Each person and
subsequently each attack team was given a total score.
Performance variables. The attack teams and their reactions were observed
during two different war games in a ULA-class tactical trainer. This simulator is a
replica of the submarine central, the natural work space of an attack team. The sim-
ulator presented information about own speed and depth as well as all information
available about other ships that would be present for the attack team on board a real
ULA-class submarine. Computer software in the simulator recorded target solu-
tions, firing range, hits, and course and speed of own and other vessels. Crite-
ria-based evaluation of efficiency consisted of accuracy, latency, and mission ef-
fectiveness (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). Latency was measured as distance in
meters to targets at the moment of firing and when it was actually hit. Mission ef-
fectiveness was the number of torpedoes hitting the target.
Process variables. Teamwork was evaluated on four dimensions: informa-
tion exchange, communication, supporting behavior, and team initiative (based on
ATOM; Smith-Jentsch et al., 1998).
Verbal processes were examined using video and audio tape recordings (Sony
TCM-459V) and video (Sony Super Steady Shot Handycam video HI8 CCD
TR2200E PAL; Serfaty, Entin, & Johnston, 1998). The number of statements was
registered as total amount (statements per minute) and separated into three catego-
ries: request, transfer, and confirmation. Request and transfer were divided into in-
formation, actions, and problem solving (see Serfaty et al., 1998). In addition,
statements confirming request and transfer were registered. Every statement was
also registered with respect to the sender and the receiver.
Psychophysiological arousal. Cardiovascular responses were measured by
using the Ambulatory Monitoring System V. 3. 6. (AMS; Klaver, de Geus, & de
Vries, 1994). The cardiac responses were measured with 8 mm Ag/AgC1 ECG
electrodes (Cleartrode, Disposable Pregelled Electrodes, 150, Standard Silver).
One electrode was placed over the jugular notch of the sternum, between the col-
larbones; another was placed 4 cm under the left ribs; and the third electrode was
placed at the right lateral side between the two lower ribs. Heart rate was recorded
as beats per minute (bpm).
Procedure
The study was conducted in the tactical submarine simulator for the ULA-class
submarine situated at Haakonsvern Naval Base in Bergen, Norway. Norwegian
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submarine crews use the tactical simulator as part of their normal enhancement
training. The training program follows established demands and progression lev-
els. All four attack teams were experienced users of the simulator at the time of this
study. The head of submarine simulator training noted that the teams were equiva-
lent in terms of performance. All four attack teams were rated as operational and
approved by their superiors to be functioning on the highest level within 2 months
prior to this study.
The two war game scenarios used in this study were consistent with the training
program the attack teams normally go through and identical for all teams. The sce-
narios were event based (Johnston, Payne, & Smith-Jentsch, 1998), following the
same design used in the studies of the TADMUS project. The war games were
comprised of realistic stressors that gave the teams an increasing amount of work-
load and need for coordination. An experienced submarine expert evaluated both
war games as realistic and consisting of the necessary stress level.
The participants completed the IPK questionnaire and were then equipped with
the AMS before entering the simulator. Ten minutes before each war game started,
the commanding officer got a description of the situation his team was supposed to
handle. Each of the two war games lasted 50 min. One game was run with an intact
original team (known team). The second run was performed with a second in com-
mand (2iC) from a different team (unknown team). The runs were administered in
balanced order.
To look at stress reactivity, each run was separated into two distinct phases. The
low-stress phase involved classification and calculations of bearings of opponents.
The last 10 min (high-stress phase) involved a high-stress situation in which the at-
tack teams had several torpedoes in the water and a manipulated problem with the
torpedoes. The problem was identical for all teams and both conditions. In addi-
tion, the submarine was attacked by a hostile submarine.
Statistical Analyses
T tests for independent samples were used to test differences in IPK between the
different attack teams. Analyses of performance during the simulator run were
based on a repeated measures design (Ferguson, 1981), and t tests for dependent
samples were used to test differences between the two conditions. Due to the spe-
cific predictions about the directions of the means, one-tailed tests were used (Fer-
guson, 1982). Analyses of physiological arousal were performed using a 2 (known
vs. unknown teams) × 2 (low-stress vs. high-stress phase) factorial design (Fergu-
son, 1982), using a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA); both factors were
treated as repeated measures. Preplanned simple effects and contrasts were per-
formed by means of one-tailed t tests due to the clear predictions of the direction of
the means (Wilcox, 1997).
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RESULTS
Preconditions
No differences between the teams on IPK were found. Examination of the scores on
the IPK of the four 2iC teams indicated that the four scores were almost identical.
Performance
Better performance measured as number of hits on target was found for known
teams compared to unknown teams, t(3) = 2.45, p < .05. This can be seen in Figure
1, where known teams shows better performance than unknown teams.
The criteria-based measurement of performance also showed a nonsignificant
tendency toward superior behavior of known teams. Although not significant,
there was a trend for known teams to discover, classify, attack, and hit targets at a
longer distance than unknown teams. Known teams fired their weapons at a mean
distance of 59,657 m compared to a distance of 55,200 m for unknown teams.
Known teams also hit their targets from longer distance (M = 30,325 m) compared
to unknown teams (M = 21,625 m).
Team Processes
Rate of information exchange was significantly different between the two groups
(see Figure 2). A higher volume of verbal statements occurred in the unknown
team member group compared to the known group, t(23) = 1.78, p < .05.
When looking at types of information exchange, unknown teams showed
higher frequencies of requests, t(23) = 1.81, p < .05. These requests were separated
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FIGURE 1 Mean number of hits on target for the unknown and the known team.
into request for information, request for action, and request for solving a problem.
Unknown teams showed higher frequencies on all these measures: t(3) = 2.24, p <
.05; t(3) = 3.36, p < .05; and t(3) = 2.35, p < .05, respectively (see Figure 3).
An indication of a similar pattern was discovered for the analyses of transfer of
information, transfer of action, and transfer of problem solving. There was a trend
toward higher level of information transfer in the unknown group compared to the
known group, t(3) = 1.84, p < .08 (one-tailed). There were also nonsignificant ten-
dencies toward higher numbers of transfer of actions and problem solving for the
unknown compared to the known teams.
When investigating which position contributed most to the increase in informa-
tion exchange between the two conditions, a clear picture emerged. The command-
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FIGURE 2 Mean number of verbalizations per minute.
FIGURE 3 Mean number of verbalizations per minute in three information categories.
ing officer verbalized significantly more to the unknown 2iC, t(3) = 2.67, p < .05,
and the unknown 2iC’s verbalization to the commanding officer tended to be
higher compared to that of the known 2iC, t(3) = 2.02, p < .07. As can be seen in
Table 1, all exchange of information in the triad, commanding officer—the rest of
the crew—2iC, increased when the 2iC was unknown.
When positional information exchange was paired with type of information it
showed that the commanding officer had significantly more requests to his un-
known 2iC, t(3) = 5.8, p < .05, compared to the known 2iC. Unknown 2iCs made
significantly more requests to the commanding officer compared to known 2iCs,
t(3) = 3.45, p < .05. The categories of transfer and confirmation were significantly
higher from unknown 2iC to commanding officer compared to known 2iC, t(3) =
2.29, p < .05 and t(3) = 1.68 , p < .05 (one-tailed), respectively. No other significant
effects were found.
Psychophysiological Arousal
Analyses of cardiovascular activity showed a borderline significant main effect of
groups, F(1, 22) = 3.62, p < .07, with higher heart rate (HR) during the unknown
team condition. Furthermore, a borderline main effect was found for the
high-stress compared to the low-stress phase, resulting in higher HR in the
high-stress phase, F(1, 22) = 3.4, p < .07.
Preplanned contrasts showed that the only significant difference found was an
increase in HR from low-stress to high-stress phase in unknown teams (p < .05; see
Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
This study showed superior performance in known submarine attack teams com-
pared to unknown teams. When expert teams changed from an unknown 2iC to a
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TABLE 1
Quantity of Information Exchange Separated for Different Positions
in the Attack Team
Information Exchange
Commanding Officer–Crew–2iC
Known 2iC Unknown 2iC
M SD M SD
Commanding officer–crew 2.90 0.47 3.25 0.82
Crew–commanding officer 2.30 0.41 2.63 1.03
Commanding officer–2iC* 1.12 0.75 1.63 0.65
2iC–commanding officer 1.04 0.60 1.52 0.61
Note. 2iC = second in command.
*p < .05.
well-known 2iC, the number of torpedoes on target increased, information ex-
change decreased, and members showed less physiological stress reaction.
The main purpose of a submarine attack team is to sink enemy ships with torpe-
does. This study showed that attack teams composed of well-known team mem-
bers had more hits by torpedoes compared to teams with an unknown 2iC. This
was found although the teams and the officers had equal knowledge and experi-
ence about the system they operated. It could be argued that teams with a
well-known 2iC had an SMM that facilitated performance.
This expands previous knowledge about SMMs, where the focus has been on
equipment, task, and team interaction (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Perfor-
mance data were further supported by a pattern of nonsignificant results that all
pointed in the same direction. This was the case, for example, with the variable
of distance to target when firing and correct classifications. Thus, disrupting the
SMM of expert members, while keeping the level of knowledge of equipment,
tasks, and roles constant, decreased performance on crucial aspects of the sub-
marine’s performance.
The analyses of team processes showed that the amount of information was
higher in the unknown group. It has been assumed that well-developed SMMs en-
able teams to coordinate their activities in a way that increases their ability to cope
with external threats (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989). Through SMMs, team members
have better capability to predict other team members’ actions and need for infor-
mation (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Thus, the need for explicit coordination of
information transfer will be lower in teams with a highly developed SMM
(Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989). In this study, it could be argued that the increased ex-
change of information seen in the unknown team was an indication of a lack of an
SMM of the team members. This argument could be valid because all teams had
similar operational SMMs (equipment, task, and roles).
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FIGURE 4 Heart rate, beats per minute (Bpm) for known and unknown teams, in high-stress
and low-stress phases.
The significance of an SMM of team members also became evident in the anal-
yses of types of information exchanged. In this study, the types of information
were categorized in two major categories: requests and transfers. These categories
were further divided into information (need to know), actions (demanding the exe-
cution of an order), and solving a problem (need something to be done; Serfaty et
al., 1998). The results of this study showed higher levels of all measures of request
and a borderline difference in transfer. The unknown attack teams exchanged in-
formation to a greater degree and the information was more controlling. This was a
change in coordination strategy from a more implicit strategy in the known attack
teams, to an explicit controlling strategy when the teams changed from a
well-known 2iC to an unknown 2iC. The substance of the statements used in the
explicit strategy was dominated by a need for increased control over the team
members. Significantly more requests and transfers give a clear indication that un-
known teams needed to coordinate their activity verbally through checking that
something was done in a proper manner. This shows that teams without an SMM of
the team members coordinate their activity differently and less efficiently than
those with such an SMM. This is in line with Urban, Bowers, Monday, and Morgan
(1995), who claimed in a study of hierarchical and nonhierarchical teams that effi-
cient teams are characterized by minimized use of question–answer sequences.
Our study also showed that teams with an SMM of the team members showed re-
duced question–answer sequences.
Further analyses of the information exchange within the attack teams revealed
an interesting pattern. This pattern showed that more information was exchanged
between the commanding officer and the 2iC in the unknown teams. There was
also more information exchange from the 2iC to the commanding officer in the un-
known teams. This gives further support to the notion that the information struc-
ture in the unknown team was distorted, and it was characterized by the need for
the commanding officer and the 2iC to coordinate and control each orders needs,
intentions, and actions. The commanding officer and the 2iC were the team mem-
bers that made most of the decisions. Thus, the lack of an SMM among team mem-
bers results in an increase in the need for explicit coordination among the team’s
senior decision makers.
One aspect of the TADMUS project was the extensive use of randomly com-
posed teams of experts (Duncan et al., 1996). Expert teams are not just an aggre-
gate of highly skilled operators working together. It could be argued that an expert
team also consists of members with extensive knowledge about each team member
and that they have trained and served together over a prolonged period of time.
This study supports the importance of this notion and shows that not only will ex-
pert teams with an SMM of the team members show improved performance, but
also show increased stress resilience. This is based on the findings that only the un-
known teams showed a significant increase in HR from low-intensity to high-in-
tensity scenarios. HR is often used as a measure of a stress response (Kudielka,
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Buske-Kirschbaum, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 2004) and Schommer,
Hellhammer, and Kirschbaum (2004) showed a decrease in HR during the stress
response over time. As can be seen from this study, the groups without an SMM of
the team members showed an increase in HR over time as the workload increased,
but only when they were exposed to a condition with an unknown 2iC.
The research described in the TADMUS project was based on studies per-
formed on participants recruited from the U.S. Navy or U.S. colleges (Can-
non-Bowers & Salas, 1998). Although there are cultural differences between the
U.S. Navy and the Norwegian Navy, the theoretical framework of SMMs appears
quite applicable to teamwork in the Norwegian Navy.
In summary, this study demonstrated that knowledge about team members (i.e.,
SMM of the team members) adds to performance over and above the contribution
of operational skills. This was evident for performance evaluations like number of
hits on target, as well as team processes like information exchange. The need for
controlling types of information was higher when teams changed from a known
2iC to an unknown 2iC. Stress reactivity, measured by HR, increased from a
low-stress to a high-stress situation only in the teams without a highly developed
SMM of the team members. This study has implications for training and rotation
of personnel in expert teams. Mastery of rules, procedures, and skills is not enough
for high performance in a crew. Personnel need to develop an SMM of the other
team members. Keeping crews intact during training and operations could do this.
Rotation of personnel among different vessels and expert teams may result in de-
creased efficiency. Although the effects of known team members add to the perfor-
mance of knowledge in expert teams, well-known teams could be more negatively
affected by negative group processes like groupthink and other socially induced bi-
ases (Janis, 1972).
In addition, a need for further studies on the effects of SMMs of team members
is called for. This is especially true because there is an increased emphasis on
networkcentric warfare, where different expert teams must coordinate their activi-
ties. These teams are often located apart and SMMs of team members could influ-
ence the performance of these teams.
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Abstract 
The aim of the present study was to test whether the Shared Mental Models of team members 
have an effect on team performance, communication and physical arousal when distributed 
teams are forced to coordinate their activities in pursuit of a common goal.  A sample (N = 
15) of newly formed navy teams was compared with a sample (N = 13) of seasoned navy 
teams who had received extensive training as a team. All teams were exposed to a novel naval 
scenario they had no previous experience from or knowledge about, i.e. close support of a 
civilian tanker operating in littoral waters in a naval simulator (tactical trainer). The results 
showed that familiar teams displayed higher performance levels, faster reaction times, more 
accuracy, and greater mission success compared to unfamiliar teams. A significant shift in 
communication strategy was observed between unfamiliar and familiar teams, in that the latter 
increased “push” of information during times of high workload. From baseline to low 
workload, the familiar teams increased HR significantly, while the unfamiliar teams showed 
no differences. Recovery of hearth rate was only found in the familiar teams. Implications for 
team training and shared mental models of team members in the familiar teams are discussed.   
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Do shared mental models of team members influence performance in distributed teams? 
In safety critical organisations (SCOs) such as the military, operational decisions are most 
often made by designated individuals who are dependent on timely information and 
coordination with fellow team members in order to achieve desired outcomes (Cebrowski & 
Garstka, 1998). Decisions are often made under the strain of time pressure, uncertainty, and 
threat of fatal consequences.  Technological developments in information-communication 
technology and command and control systems add to the complexity even if the purpose is to 
facilitate the challenges of command and control in operational environments. One 
consequence of this increasingly complex man- machine interface is the need to carefully 
coordinate and synchronize between teams separated physically, so called distributed teams. 
In addition, most SCOs such as the military, rotate personnel through 24/7 shift-work 
schedule which makes it difficult to maintain stable person/role expectations in the 
operational teams over time. 
This lack of face-to-face interaction and familiarity with fellow team members are two major 
issues that might affect team coordination, communication, efficiency and outcomes. To 
examine the consequences of familiarity between teams this study investigates the differences 
in outcomes (communication, stress and efficiency) between familiar and unfamiliar teams 
who are forced to coordinate their activities towards a shared goal in a distributed team setting 
(i.e. separated by geographic distance).  
A recurring question in team research has been to identify factors that constitute good 
teamwork and how excellence in teamwork is manifested in actual behaviour (Koslowski & 
Ilgen. 2006). One promising theoretical perspective that has attracted considerable attention in 
recent years is the Shared Mental Model approach (SMM; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001). 
Salas, Sims, and Burke (2005) proposed five core components that promote team 
effectiveness. These components include team leadership, mutual performance monitoring, 
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backup behaviour, adaptability and team orientation. Salas et al. (2005) suggest SMM are the 
supporting and coordinating mechanism that melds together the value of each of the five. This 
stems from the notion that teams working in high-intensity environments coordinate their 
activities efficiently when the team members are able to anticipate and predict each others’ 
needs and are able to identify changes in the team, task or teammates and adjusting strategy as 
needed. To make this possible, the team members must have similar or shared mental models 
of the system with which they are interacting. If the mental models are shared, then this 
allows team members to draw on their own mental models as the basis for choosing actions 
that are consistent and coordinated with other team members. In high performing teams this is 
done even without coordination or actions being explicitly required. According to the 
theoretical framework, SMMs are proposed to explain why high performance teams often 
coordinate their behaviour without explicit communication (Cannon-Bowers, Salas & 
Converse, 1993). Duncan, Rouse, Johnston, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Burns (1996) suggest 
that teams with shared mental models also will be more resilient to stress effects, due to their 
redundancy and ability to supply, substitute, or select information based on a superior 
understanding of team-role needs. 
Research into team effectiveness has shown that some teams can maintain performance 
over time under conditions of high workload even when opportunities to communication are 
limited (Kleiman & Serfaty, 1989). Wittenbaum, Vaughan & Stasser (1998) argue that 
coordination is an essential component of successful team performance. However, they 
suggest that successful groups coordinate their efforts by communicating implicitly. To 
coordinate implicitly saves time but may also increase the possibility of failure (Wittenbaum 
et.al. 1998).  It is therefore suggested that successful implicit coordination rests on the team’s 
ability to share a common understanding of the situation, which constitutes a core element of 
the SMM approach (Cannon-Bowers et.al. 1993).  More specifically, in order to coordinate 
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their activity, teams with SMMs will not only reduce the amount of communication they use 
(implicitly), they will also change their communication patterns from pulling (requesting) to 
pushing (presenting) information when the workload increases. According to Entin and 
Serfaty (1999), this shift in communication pattern is reflected in the ratio that results when 
transfers are divided by requests for information (‘the global anticipation ratio’). An increase 
in ‘the global anticipation ratio’ is seen to represent a strong indication of SMM (Entin & 
Serfaty, 1999). As an example, Orasanu (1990) reported that superior teams increasing the 
push of information from team members and reducing requests for information from the team 
leader during high workload periods.  
Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas & Volpe (1995) propose four types of SMMs. In 
addition to SMM of equipment, task and interaction, an SMM of the team members (team) is 
suggested.  This model contains information that is specific to the team and constitutes an 
SMM of the individual team members’ knowledge, skills, attitudes, preferences, and 
tendencies. SMMs related to technology/equipment, the task at hand and team interaction 
have frequently been emphasised in previous research (Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas & 
Milanovich, 1999).  
In spite of repeated statements concerning the importance of the fourth type, SMM of 
team members, few empirical studies of this factor have been published to date. This is 
surprising and indicates a vital gap in the knowledge base, given the widespread occurrence of 
work teams that are unfamiliar with each other even in SCOs. One notable exception is 
Woody, Mckinney, Barker and Clothier (1994) who analyzed 74 major airline accidents and 
found that newly formed (unknown) crews flew more safely then fixed (known) crews. On the 
other hand, Kanki and Foushee (1989) reported that if the captain and first officer had 
recently flown together, they committed fewer errors and engaged in more open 
communication with respect to information exchange.  Furthermore, a study of submarine 
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attack teams showed that familiar crews performed better, showed more efficient 
communication patterns and had lower cardiovascular activity during high workload 
situations than a crew with one unfamiliar crewmember (Espevik, Johnson, Eid, & Thayer, 
2006). This result emerged after controlling for knowledge about tasks and equipment, as well 
as the roles and responsibilities of the team (i.e. the three other types proposed SMM). 
Although findings from aviation and maritime industries emphasise the importance of shared 
mental models of team members, the results so far are not conclusive. The present study 
provides new information by exploring the limits of shard mental models of teammembers in 
familiar and unfamiliar distributed teams facing an operational task.    
The lack of face-to-face interaction in distributed teams results in new challenges in terms 
of team coordination and communication that could influence team efficiency and outcomes. 
It is therefore necessary to generate more empirical knowledge about mechanisms that 
influence coordination and performance outcomes in distributed teams. Recent research 
suggests that face to face teams and distributed teams manifest communication and other 
teamwork processes differently (Priest, Stagl, Klein, Salas & Burke, 2006). To our 
knowledge, the present study is unique in that both face-to-face contacts within the teams and 
distributed team processes are investigated in the same study.  
On the basis of emerging, although limited, research on teams in SCOs, it is reasonable to 
assume that knowledge about other team members will influence team processes and outcome 
in high workload situations. From previous research it is reasonable to assume that teams with 
SMM of each other will coordinate their activities differently (better), showing more 
teamwork behaviour made possible by their SMM of each other (e.g. backup and monitoring, 
Salas et al., 2005). The result is enhanced performance (e.g. fewer errors, mission success, 
more accuracy, latency) (Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999).  
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  From the above discussion, we hypothesised that familiar teams would show enhanced 
performance and better coordinating skills compared to unfamiliar teams. More specifically, 
in the present study we predict that familiar, compared to the unfamiliar teams will: 
H1:  show higher mission success measured as reaction time as well as accuracy, both in 
the low and high workload scenario.  
A second prediction is that familiar teams will be better in identifying changes in the 
team, task or team mates and eventually anticipate team members future actions (Salas et.al, 
2005). This will enable familiar teams to adjust strategies as needed and we expected familiar 
teams to: 
H2:  communicate less during a high workload situation compared to unfamiliar teams 
(Espevik et al., 2006).  
H3:  enhance global anticipation ratio (more “push” of information) from low to high 
workload condition (Entin & Serfaty, 1999),  
H4: have a higher rate of monitoring behaviour (Salas et.al. 2005).  
It was also predicted that the familiar teams will be less involved in: 
H5:  task-irrelevant communication (Kanki & Foushee, 1989).  
Although stressors (e.g. physical distance, workload) may reduce the amount of 
information flow, and teammembers may become more limited as to the tasks they can 
perform we expected familiar teams to be able to coordinate more implicitly when needed 
because of their knowledge of the teammembers. We expected this to put lower cognitive load 
on familiar teams compared unfamiliar, thus we anticipated that familiar teams would be 
H6: less aroused (i.e. lower heart rate) during high workload condition.  
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Methods 
Subjects 
A total of 108 cadets from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy (mean age 24, 2 years, 
range 21-32) were recruited to the present study. The subjects’ military service background 
ranged from two to 10 years, 9.2% were female officers, and the subjects’ ranks ranged from 
Sub-Lieutenant to Lieutenant. Although the training was mandatory, participation in the 
research project was voluntary and seven declined to take part in the study, leaving a total of 
101 subjects that had their heart rate measured. Due to equipment failure there were 84 
subjects who completed the full video recording. None of the subjects had previous 
experience of the simulator or other forms of simulator training in general.  
Procedure 
Subjects were categorised as members of familiar or unfamiliar teams. To be included in 
the familiar teams group, the team members had to have completed the first year of basic 
officer training together at the Norwegian Naval Academy. During this first year, the cadets 
are organised into permanent teams of six persons that stay together for eight months. During 
this period, the fixed teams share as a team the hardship of a number of extensive exercises as 
well as a nine-week period on a tall-masted ship on a transatlantic crossing. This results in 
extended knowledge about individual differences in competencies, skills, abilities, 
preferences and tendencies (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). The present study included 13 
familiar teams. 
The other category, the unfamiliar teams group, consisted of cadets from another cohort 
at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. The participants had no previous history together, 
either as individuals or as members of other teams, except for a one-week getting acquainted 
period at the start of the semester.  To control for any learning effects of being a cadet at the 
Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, 8 teams of third-year cadets were formed. They had no 
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experience of each other as members of the same team during their own first year nor any 
history of attending the same classes during the second or third year. No differences between 
third-year cadets and the group that had just started were found on any measures. Hence, in 
the following, they were treated as one category, unfamiliar teams. Together, these subjects 
formed a total of 15 unfamiliar teams.  
The study was carried out in a high fidelity simulator that is a replica of a naval 
operations room. Expert instructors from the Royal Norwegian Navy developed the scenario 
used in the present study.  The scenario was event-based (Johnston, Payne & Smith-Jentsch, 
1998, Espevik et. al., 2006), with four events in the low and four events in the high workload 
condition. 
During the simulation, each of the original six-member teams was randomly divided into 
two three-member teams. The two (sub) teams then manned two different simulator cubicles 
(i.e. naval vessels) with a common goal of providing close protection to an oil tanker in 
littoral waters. The tanker was sailing to an oil refinery. The two (sub) teams/vessels were 
faced with the challenge of coordinating their activities and controlling the area close to the 
tanker. This involved surveillance and coordination of air and surface traffic in the area and 
subsequent military actions to protect the tanker and prevent hostile actions. The scenario was 
designed to include realistic stressors that gave the teams an increasing workload and a 
greater need for coordination and communication both within and between the teams.   
In order to look at the effects of workload, the scenario was separated into two phases. 
The low workload phase lasted for 40 minutes and included four distinct events. The first 
phase involved surveillance of two vessels at long distance, followed by two vessels at close 
range, which required active communication to establish their identity and mission. The next 
15 minutes (the high workload phase) also consisted of four distinct events, including an 
enemy warship, an unknown helicopter, equipment failure on the team’s own ship and a 
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merchant vessel moving in too close to the oil tanker. The high workload phase took place 
when the oil tanker was in littoral waters, which restricted navigation and gave the naval 
protection teams little time to react. All the teams were presented with the same scenarios. 
Team members were randomly assigned to one of two identical vessels and randomly 
assigned to three different positions in the operations room. Those positions were electro-
optical surveillance and firing, commanding officer and overall picture.   
The study started with a 30-minute briefing on the scenario, consisting of setting, order, 
intelligence information, the outline of the simulator and function of the equipment. This was 
followed by 30 minutes’ on-hands training on the designated position in the simulator. After 
this, the personnel were equipped with ambulatory cardiac recording equipment before 
entering a 30-minute planning phase. Baseline Heart Rate was recorded for five minutes 
before entering the simulator. Continuous recordings were obtained during the scenario in the 
simulator.  After completion, another five minutes was recorded during recovery. All 
recordings were obtained while the subjects were seated.  
Two paid, independent raters categorised the information exchange in the teams. They 
were unfamiliar with the SMM theory, the scenario and experimental set-up. Both raters were 
introduced to and trained in the use of the Noldus program (Noldus, Trienes, Hendriksen, 
Jansen, & Jansen, 1991, 2000).  The two raters established a common understanding of the 
categories by rating several videos together before the actual recording of the videos. The 
inter-rater reliability showed an intra-class correlation of .98 (p<.00). This was based on the 
average of the two raters’ evaluations of three teams.  
Instruments 
Performance.  Performance measures were based on transcripts from the simulator, video and 
voice recording. They were examined using criteria-based evaluation of efficiency, consisting 
of mission success, accuracy and latency (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997).     
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----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Mission success was defined according to the specific objective of the mission – i.e. to 
avoid or minimise hostile threat to the oil tanker. To assess this outcome measure, a scoring 
system was developed, whereby high scores indicated a high level of mission success (i.e. 
safe escort of the oil tanker). For each event except for weapon malfunction, which had its 
own estimate, performance scores were defined and accumulated as follows (maximum of 
three points):  
a) Positioning own vessel between the threat and oil tanker (one point), b) establishing voice 
contact with the threat (one point), c) own weapon system in a ready status pointing towards 
the threat (one point).  
One event, weapon malfunctioning, was treated separately and assigned an accumulated score 
of maximum four points as follows: a) ready to fire (one point), b) firing warning shot across 
the bow to stop the enemy vessel (one point), c) firing after the lookout had reported activity 
around the canon on the enemy ship (one point), and d) transferring information about the 
incident to the other vessel (one point). 
Each of the eight events in the scenario was measured for accuracy. The accuracy score 
was computed as a composite score based on observation (observed = one point / not 
observed = zero points) of the following operational factors: discovered, monitored, made 
verbal contact, evaluated, made plans for handling the situation, informed (friendly vessel), 
and classification (the identity of the contact). Each team could score a total of 54 points, 28 
during the low workload period and 28 during the high workload period. 
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Latency was measured as an accumulated score based on reaction times (in seconds). To 
obtain this accumulated score, each of the eight events in the scenario was scored for how 
quickly the team responded. Firstly, the latency to sharing the information within the team, 
secondly the time taken to make an assessment (based on this information) and, thirdly, how 
rapidly they made a decision about action. Since these three responses are sequential in 
nature, three points were earned if the response was performed within a timeframe of 10 
seconds from the previous response (i.e. evaluating after sharing and decisions after 
evaluation). Two points were earned if the response was performed within 10 to 20 seconds, 
one point between 20 and 30 seconds and zero points if over 30 seconds. Within each of these 
responses – from sharing, evaluation and action – a total of nine points was attainable for each 
event.  
Team processes. The number of statements was registered as the total number of statements 
per minute. In line with Entin, Johnston & Serfaty (1998), each statement was classified as a 
request for information, a transfer of information, an action or problem solving.  
The global anticipation ratio was calculated by dividing the total number of transfers by 
the total number of requests (Entin & Serfaty, 1999). The index was computed within teams 
as well as between teams separated physically. Thus, a change (increase) in the global 
anticipation ratio from low to high workload may be taken as a strong indication of SMMs of 
team members (Entin & Serfaty, 1999).    
The non-verbal behaviour was examined on the basis of the video and labelled 
monitoring behaviour (Salas et.al., 2005). The number of glances at other positions, 
equipment and other team members was registered. This resulted in a quantification of 
monitoring behaviour, thus serving as an indicator of SMMs of team members.  
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Physiological arousal. Cardiovascular responses were measured using an Ambulatory 
Monitoring System V. 3. 6. (AMS, Klaver, de Geus & de Vries, 1994). The Inter Beat 
Intervals were measured using 8 mm Ag/AgC1 ECG electrodes (Cleartrode, Disposable 
Pregelled Electrodes, 150, Standard Silver). One electrode was placed over the jugular notch 
of the sternum, between the collarbones, another was placed four centimetres under the left 
ribs, and the third electrode was placed on the right lateral side between the two lower ribs. 
Heart rate (HR) was recorded as beats per minute (bpm).  
Design and statistics 
The study was carried out using a 2 (Familiar teams vs. Unfamiliar teams) x 2 (high vs. 
low workload phase) factorial design. Analyses of HR were performed as a manipulation 
check for the different phases of the simulation. Thus, a 2 (Familiar teams vs. Unfamiliar 
teams) x 4 (baseline vs. low workload vs. high workload vs. recovery) factorial design 
(Ferguson, 1982) was used. The first factor was treated as a between-group factor and the 
second factor as a within-group factor in all analyses. When hypotheses based on specific 
predictions of the directions of the means were tested, non-significant interaction effects were 
followed up. (See Wilcox, 1987 for a discussion.)  Stoline and Spjotvoll HSD tests for 
unequal sample sizes were used as post-hoc tests.  
Results 
Performance scores 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
A main effect of group was found for mission success, F (1, 26) = 22.96, p < .001, with 
the familiar teams scoring higher than the unfamiliar teams. A main effect of workload was 
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found, with higher scores for mission success in the high workload condition F (1, 26) = 
21.57, p < .001.  
A main effect of factor group was also found on accuracy, with familiar teams scoring 
higher than the unfamiliar teams, F (1,26) = 22.83, p < .001. A main effect of workload was 
also found, with higher accuracy in the high workload condition, F (1, 26) = 12.97, p < .001. 
A borderline significant interaction F (1, 26) = 3.86, p< .06) was followed up using the 
Stoline and Spjotvoll HSD test. The result revealed higher accuracy in the familiar teams 
compared with the unfamiliar teams in both low and high workload conditions (both p< .01). 
However, the unfamiliar teams improved its performance from low to high workload (p <. 
001), while the familiar teams showed higher scores in both conditions. 
For latency, a main effect of groups was found F (1, 26) = 129.13, with the familiar 
teams showing a higher (shorter reaction times) latency score than the unfamiliar teams. No 
other comparisons reached significance level. 
Team processes within each vessel 
Amount of information exchange. Results from the analyses of information exchange within 
each vessel showed no differences between groups or conditions.  
Global Anticipation ratio. A main effect of workload condition was found, F (1, 26) =  5.04, 
p< .03. This was caused by a higher anticipation of information ratio (more push) during the 
high stress condition. Furthermore, a borderline interaction of group by workload condition, F 
(1, 26) = 3.6, p<, 07, was followed up. The results only showed an increase in anticipation 
ratio only for the familiar teams (p < .04) from low to high workload condition. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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Non-task-relevant information. A main effect of group was found, with unfamiliar teams 
relaying more irrelevant information than familiar teams, F (1, 26) = 9.23, p <.05. An 
interaction of group by workload condition reached significance level, F (1, 26) = 4.1, p< .05. 
HSD tests only revealed an increase in irrelevant information relay for unfamiliar teams (p< 
.05) from low to high workload condition. The unfamiliar teams also had higher numbers of 
irrelevant information relays during the high workload condition compared to the familiar 
teams (p< .01). 
Monitoring behaviour.  A main effect of workload condition was found, with reduced 
monitoring during high compared to low workload condition, F (1, 26) = 7.19, p < .01. 
Because of the specific hypothesis proposed, a non-significant interaction was followed up. A 
decrease in monitoring behaviour from low to high stress condition was found only for the 
unfamiliar teams (p< .03). 
Team processes between the cooperating vessels 
Amount of information exchange. Results from the analyses of information exchange between 
vessels showed a main effect of workload condition, F (1, 26) = 10.4, p < .003. This was 
caused by increased communication between vessels during the high workload condition.  
The non-significant interaction of groups by workload condition was followed up. This was 
done because of the hypothesised direction of change. The results revealed an increase in 
communication for familiar teams from low to high workload condition (p < .05). No 
difference was found for unfamiliar teams.  
Global Anticipation ratio. A main effect of workload condition was found, F (1, 26) = 52.146, 
p< .01. This was caused by a higher Global anticipation ratio (more push) during the high 
workload condition. There were no differences between the familiar teams and unfamiliar 
teams.  
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------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Since the global anticipation ratio consists of several different processes, the findings were 
followed up by looking at differences in specific communication patterns 
Information transfer. A main effect of groups was found, with familiar teams showing higher 
numbers of transfers than unfamiliar teams, F (1,26) = 12.61, p < .001. A main effect of 
workload condition revealed higher numbers of transfers during the high workload condition 
compared with the low workload condition, F (1, 26) = 93.28, p < .001. Furthermore, the 
interaction of groups by workload condition reached significance level, F (1, 26) = 8.83, p < 
.001. A Stoline and Spjotvoll HSD test showed that both groups enhanced their transfer scores 
from low to high workload condition (both p’s < .001). In addition, a group difference was 
found for the high workload condition with the familiar teams showing higher numbers of 
transfers compared to the unfamiliar teams (p < .001). No such difference occurred during the 
low workload condition. 
Physiological arousal 
Analyses of cardiovascular activity showed a main effect of workload condition, F 
(3,297) = 13.31, p < .01. A follow-up HSD test revealed an increase in HR from baseline to 
low workload period (first 10 min; p<.001) and further to the high workload period (last 15 
minutes; p<.001). The recovery phase was also significantly higher than the baseline 
(p<.001). Furthermore, an interaction of groups by condition was found, F(3,294)= 6.20, p < 
.01. (The trajectories of mean HR responses over time in the two groups are shown in Figure 
4.) The Stoline and Spjotvoll post-hoc test revealed that familiar teams increased HR 
significantly from baseline to the low (p< .001) and high workload periods (p< .001).  There 
was no difference between baseline and recovery. For unfamiliar teams, the pattern was 
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different, with no differences between baseline and low workload, followed by a significant 
increase in the high workload phase (p<0.001). In addition, no recovery was found, since 
unfamiliar teams had higher recovery HR compared with their baseline (p<.001).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Discussion 
In this simulated naval threat scenario, familiar teams outperformed unfamiliar teams on 
all outcome measures, higher mission success, higher accuracy and shorter response latencies. 
Statements per minute showed no differences between familiar and unfamiliar. Familiar teams 
changed its global anticipation ratio from low to high workload. Only unfamiliar teams 
decreased its monitoring behaviour from low to high workload and were more involved in 
task-irrelevant communication. Investigating the communication between the vessels, 
contrary to what we expected only familiar teams increased statements per minute from low 
to high workload. There were no differences in global anticipation ratio, even though the 
overall effect was an increase from low to high workload.  But only familiar teams increased 
transfer from low to high workload. The familiar teams were more aroused (heart rate per 
minute) during low workload. During recovery only familiar teams decreased arousal. 
 We argue that the mechanism that explains these findings could be a more developed 
SMM of the team members in the familiar teams compared to the unfamiliar teams (Cannon-
Bowers et.al. 1993). It also both replicates and extends the findings of Espevik et al. (2006). 
Espevik et al (2006) studied teams of experts, submarine crews, and they were able to show 
significantly more torpedo hits when the team was intact compared with situations where the 
team included one new member(replaced one “old” teammember).  
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The present study indicates that, if a team faces a totally new and unfamiliar situation (the 
tactical trainer), familiar teams outperforms unfamiliar teams. We suggest that these 
differences in performance are caused by a better communication/coordination process 
enabled by SMMs of team members in the familiar teams.  Orasanu (1990) showed that 
airline pilots used low workload periods to develop SMM, which in turn made it possible to 
employ different communication strategies during high workload, thus enabling them to 
communicate more implicitly. In our view, the change of communication strategy that takes 
place within the familiar teams when they go from the low to the high workload phase is a 
strong indication of SMMs in action. Entin and Serfaty (1999) suggest that an increase in 
global anticipation rate (total transfers/total requests) is a strong indication that a team 
transforms its communication from explicit to implicit and that this change shows that SMMs 
are operating. Unfamiliar teams met the high workload without any change of communication 
strategy, which means that there was no difference in terms of transfers of and requests for 
information. On the other hand, familiar teams altered significantly from pulling (request) to 
pushing (transfer) information when in the high workload condition.  
Another indication of SMM is proposed by Salas et.al. (2005). They suggested a strong 
connection between monitoring behaviour and SMM. They proposed that mutual performance 
monitoring only occurs in teams with adequate SMMs. Thus, the decrease in monitoring 
behaviour shown in the unfamiliar teams indicate a lack of an adequate SMM of team 
members and thereby that team members engage less in behaviour such as identifying 
mistakes or providing feedback and helping team members with a heavier workload than 
themselves. Eventually, this may have a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of the team. 
We argue that when unfamiliar teams were more involved in task-irrelevant communication, 
which increased during the high workload condition they to lesser degree were able to 
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understand that other team members were uncertain and needed help (Kanki & Foushee, 
1989).   
 Although differences were not prevalent in relation to communication pattern between 
the two vessels (distributed teams), there were indications that familiar teams engaged in 
more implicit communication. This argument is based on an increase in the frequency of 
transfers of information from low to high workload condition found in this group. This is 
especially interesting since unfamiliar teams showed no such increase. This may indicate that 
familiar teams verged on being more implicit in their communication.  This further 
strengthens the impact of SMMs of team members, also in distributed teams. 
 Contrary to what we expected, there were no differences in the amount of 
communication within each vessel, neither during low nor high workload. However, between 
vessels the familiar teams increased statements per minute from low to high workload 
compared with unfamiliar teams.  One explanation could be that familiar teams adjusted their 
communication based on what Salas et. al. (2005) describe as an ability to identify changes in 
the team, task or teammates and implicitly adjust strategies as needed. Hence when the 
situation is new, the team members are not subject matter experts but hold shared mental 
models of each others then they will be able to sense that other team members are struggling 
and need help (e.g. information).  If this is correct then it implies that novices on the task use 
their familiarity to enhance communication, be more implicit by pushing information (more 
transfer), to keep every team member up to speed with a new and inexperienced situation. It is 
also possible that familiar teams monitored each other more efficiently through verbal clues, 
like tone of voice indicating that help was needed and acted accordingly. The last argument is 
supported by the differences in transfer, when familiar teams initiated more unsolicited 
communications during high workload compared to unfamiliar teams. Thus familiar teams 
may have been more able to anticipate that the other teams (vessel) needed to share 
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information or something done and acted accordingly. It may indicate a learning strategy that 
is adaptable to a new situation when the team consists of task novices and only connected 
through verbal clues. To our view additional studies are called for to address this.   
To our knowledge, there are no studies besides Espevik et al. (2006) of SMMs of team 
members were physiological recordings have been applied. Although cardiovascular 
responses were used as a manipulation check for the high vs. low workload conditions, some 
aspects are worth mentioning. We anticipated that unfamiliar teams would be more 
physiologically aroused than familiar teams when facing a high workload condition, as shown 
in the Espevik et al. (2006) study. Contrary to our hypothesis, no differences were found. 
However, looking at HR patterns over all conditions, differences emerged between the two 
groups. From baseline to low workload, the familiar teams increased HR significantly, while 
the unfamiliar teams showed no differences. One explanation could be that having SMMs of 
teammebers enabled familiar teams to detect deviancies, shortcomings and uncertainty among 
other teammembers. They thus focused on rectifying these matters and subsequently put more 
effort into understanding and coping with the situation even though there was no immediate 
need for action. This, in turn, could result in the immediate increase in HR observed in the 
present study. Again, this could also be related to familiar teams performing better than 
unfamiliar teams.  
Recovery of HR was only found in the familiar teams, indicating higher adaptability of 
the organism to environmental demands. This ability to regulate physiological activity is 
associated with Situational Awareness (SA). For instance, Saus, Johnsen, Eid, Riisem, 
Andersen and Thayer (2006) reported an association between Heart Rate Variability (HRV) 
and SA measured during the recovery phase. Furthermore, Saus et al. (submitted) have 
showed that naval cadets who show a high degree of SA in a navigation simulator were also 
able to modulate their internal environment in order to match external demands. This was 
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found with suppression of HRV from baseline to simulation and a recovery effect. In contrast, 
the low SA group showed no differentiation of their HRV from rest to simulation and 
recovery.  
There are other possible explanations for why familiar teams outperformed unfamiliar 
teams. One factor that could have influenced the results was a possible learning effect of 
being a cadet for a year at the Royal Naval Academy compared with one week.  Since there 
were no differences between third-year cadets and first-year cadets in the unfamiliar teams on 
any dependent variable, it is unlikely that learning effects could explain the results of the 
present study. Recent literature shows increasing attention being devoted to trust as a 
precursor of team performance (Bandow, 2001). However, we argue that trust was equally 
present in familiar as unfamiliar teams. This is based on Bandow (2001), who states that 12 to 
18 hours of face-to-face contact is required to instil the appropriate trust in a team. When the 
unfamiliar teams started the study, they came straight from the introduction week at the Royal 
Norwegian Naval academy. This week involves intensive face-to-face interaction. It is 
reasonable to expect that they trusted each other. In a study on from the Norwegian Naval 
Academy, Nissestad (2007) found no differences from the first week and after the first year, 
on group climate or groups dynamics in the teams. He also showed that cadets are a 
homogeneous group, referring to personality factors measured by the NEOPi. The Nissestad 
study was conducted on five cohorts between 2001 and 2005, and it is reasonable to expect 
that this would be the case for the participants in the present study. However, future studies 
should include measures of trust. 
Another theoretical perspective that has tried to explain effects of familiarity in teams is 
the theory of transactive memory system (Wegner, 1986). In contrast to the concept of SMMs, 
transactive memory systems(TMS) is conceptualised as a set of distributed, individual 
memory systems that combines the knowledge possessed by particular team members with a 
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shared awareness of who knows what (Moreland 1999). According to transactive memory 
theory each team member will use the other team members as an external memory aid, 
thereby creating a compatible and distributed memory system (Koslowski & Ilgen. 2006). 
Kanawattanachai and Yoo (2007) demonstrated that TMS can be formed in distributed teams 
and enhance efficiency. Thus, the transactive memory system theory and findings connected 
to it, offers insightful and important knowledge about team processes.  
However research based on the TMS approach has been concentrated on knowledge 
about the task the team is meant to solve and the team’s ability to draw on different memories 
of it held by different team members. We argue that this raise two complications that 
differentiate TMS from SMMs of team members; the task must be familiar to the team and 
are not transferrable to other tasks. This implies that a team with a well developed transactive 
memory faces challenges when a novel and or critical situation arise. In the present study the 
situation and the task was novel and none of the team had any predisposition in form of 
knowledge about the task that needed to be done. When the teams that were familiar met the 
new and to them unknown simulation situation they performed better in the low and high 
workload situation.  It is reasonable that they were able to benefit from the shared knowledge 
they had on each other. We argue that SMMs of team members enabled the familiar teams to 
identify changes in the team and team members and implicitly adjust strategies needed (e.g. 
more push of information when the workload increases). The present study indicates that 
SMMs of teammembers are transferrable across tasks and functional even if the teams are 
separated physically and distinctly different for transactive memory systems. Further 
investigations are needed to study if this also implies that familiar teams learn a new task 
faster compared to unfamiliar teams.  
To sum up, the present study is the first study to provide empirical evidence for the effect 
of SMMs of teammembers distributed teams. It gives further support to the notion that SMMs 
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of teammembers is a mechanism that improves performance and communication in teams, 
and it expands previous knowledge, where the focus has been on equipment, tasks and team 
interaction, by demonstrating the importance in distributed teams. We content that SMMs of 
teammembers enable teams to coordinate activities more effectively and more implicitly even 
if separated physically and connected only by verbal communication. A team with SMMs of 
teammembers seems to regulate their physical arousal more adaptively and cope better with 
high workload.  
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Table 1.  The eight events in the scenario with maximum points for mission success, accuracy 
and latency.  
Workload Event Mission success Accuracy Latency 
Low 1. Friendly tanker 3 7 9 
2. Friendly tanker 3 7 9 
3. Fishing vessel 3 7 9 
4. Local passenger boat 3 7 9 
 Total low Workload 
Event1 – 4 
12 28 36 
High 5. Helicopter 2 7 9 
6. Hostile warship 3 7 9 
7. Friendly tanker 3 7 9 
8. Malfunction firing  4 7 9 
9. Activity on hostile Warship 0      0 9
 Total high workload 
Event5-8 
          12     28 
 
   45 
 
Table 2: Performance scores, Mission success, accuracy and Latency 
 Mission success 
Max.: 12 
Accuracy 
Max.: 28 
Latency 
Max.: 36 (Low workload) 
Max.: 45 (High workload) 
 Familiar 
 
Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Low Workload 6.38 2.6 2.87 1.81 22.84 4.93 15 3.1 29.7 3.57 14.2 4.46 
High Workload 8.46 2.6 4.6 2.16 23.92 3.64 18.67 4.24 37.46 4.89 19.47 6.85 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Global Anticipation ratio in the low and high workload condition for the Familiar 
and Unfamiliar teams. Error bars indicate 0.95 confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2. Transfer of information, for the Familiar and Unfamiliar teams in the low and high 
workload conditions. Error bars indicate 0.95 confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 3. Heart rate in beats per minute (bpm) for the Familiar and the Unfamiliar teams 
during baseline, low workload, high workload and recovery. Error bars indicate 0.95 
confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SHARED MENTAL MODELS IN DISTRIBUTED TEAMS 
 
 29
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 Familiar teams
 Unfamiliar teams
Low workload High workload
Global anticipation ratio
1,8
2,0
2,2
2,4
2,6
2,8
3,0
3,2
3,4
3,6
3,8
Tr
a
n
sf
e
rs
 
/ R
e
qu
es
ts
 
pe
r 
m
in
u
te
 
Figure 2 
 Familiar teams
 Unfamiliar teams
Low workload High workload
Transfer
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2,0
Tr
a
n
sf
er
 
o
f i
nf
or
m
a
tio
n 
pe
r 
m
in
u
te
 
Figure 3 
 Familiar teams
 Unfamiliar teams
Baseline
Low workload
High workload
Recovery
TIME
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
Bp
m
 

III

Outcomes of shared mental models of team members in cross training and high intensity simulations - 1 - 
 1
  
 
Outcomes of shared mental models of team members in cross training and high intensity 
simulations 
 
Roar Espevik1 
The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy 
Bjørn Helge Johnsen and Jarle Eid 
Department of Psychosocial Science, University of Bergen, Norway  
 
 
Key words: shared mental models, Transactive memory systems, cross training, team 
efficiency, teamwork, communication, Navy 
 
                                                          
1 Address all correspondence to The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, Pb 1 Haakonsvern, 5886 Bergen, 
Norway. E-mail: respevik@mil.no , Tel. +47 5550 5052 
 
Outcomes of shared mental models of team members in cross training and high intensity simulations - 2 - 
 2
Abstract 
The present study examined whether shared mental models of team members 
characteristics were associated with team outcomes (i.e. performance, communication, and 
physical arousal) in cross-training and a high intensity simulation requiring coordinated team 
action. In a quasi experimental design 36 Navy officer cadets were randomly assigned to 12 
newly formed tactical teams in the no shared mental modal condition (NoSMM). In contrast, 
33 Navy officer cadets in 11 seasoned teams were included in the shared mental model 
condition (TMSMM). All teams were exposed to the same naval scenarios in their cross 
training and simulation exercise. The results showed that teams with TMSMM had superior 
performance and communication patterns characterized by updates and confirmations 
compared to the NoSMM teams during cross training and simulation. During cross training 
TMSMM teams provided more updates and backup than NoSMM teams. These findings 
suggest that shared mental models of team member are transferable through tasks and 
enhance the effects of cross training. The present study extends previous research indicating 
that shared mental models is distinctly different from transactive memory systems and 
represents an independent, adaptive asset at the group level, that may enhance team 
efficiency. 
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Outcomes of shared mental models of team members in cross training and high intensity simulations 
The 26th of November 1999, MS "Sleipner" ran aground on the Norwegian west coast. 16 
people died in the worst shipping disaster of its kind in Norway since World War II. At the 
morning of the accident, the on duty captain had to be replaced by a qualified stand in. 
Although both the new captain and the chief officer (the bridge team) were formally very well 
qualified – they were unfamiliar with each other. Seconds before grounding the new captain 
instead of stopping the vessel felt it necessary to turn on the lights to check the chief officer’s 
statement about a suspected navigational error. The investigation report suggested that the 
bridge team failed to detect important critical cues and suffered from a lack of common 
understanding of the situation (NOU: 31, 2000). 
The MS Sleipner accident is unfortunately not unique in that failures of team 
leadership, coordination, and communication are frequent causes of air accidents, medical 
errors, and industrial disasters (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006).The ability to adapt to a novel 
situation is vital for team performance in high intensity situations. In safety critical 
organizations (SCOs) such as aviation, emergency services, and the military rotation of 
personnel through 24/7 shift-work schedule makes it difficult if not impossible to maintain 
stable person/role expectations over time. In addition, many SCO’s require domain experts to 
work together in a team context (e.g. emergency services and security forces). One way to 
determine the best practice in team management is to examine historical data. After analyzing 
74 major accidents in the airline industry Woody, McKinney, Barker and Clothier (1994) 
concluded that newly formed (unknown) crews flew more safely then fixed (known) crews. 
This prompted a policy in several airlines to rotate crewmembers in order to ensure 
compliance with procedures, arguing that this results in increased safety. However, this view 
is challenged by Kanki and Foushee (1989) who found empirical evidence that, if the captain 
and first officer had recently flown together, they committed fewer errors and engaged in 
more open communication with respect to information exchange. Thus, a critical issue in 
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SCOs is how team member familiarity and precise person/role expectations will inform 
effective command, control, and communication (C3) to solve safety critical issues. 
Interestingly, the literature on team processes offers two theoretical perspectives that seem to 
take quite different views to explain the outcome of team unfamiliarity. In their concept of 
shared mental model (SMM), Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse (1993) suggest that more 
effective teams share similar mental models and understanding of the situation at hand. On 
the other hand Wegner (1986) proposes that effective team work is based on a transactive 
memory system where team members compartmentalize and specialize in different work 
segments.  These apparently different perspectives inspired our quest to examine if transactive 
memory systems and shared mental models of team members are distinctly different and how 
these differences eventually might impact team performance in SCO’s.  
To our knowledge only studies within the transactive memory system framework have 
examined issues of familiarity and learning in teams (for an overview see, Moreland, 1999). 
However, if shared mental models are transferrable over different tasks (Salas et. al., 2005), 
then teams with shared mental models of team members should be able to adapt better to a 
new team performance situation or learn faster over time. Thus, one important aim of the 
present study is to examine if shared mental models of team members will transfer across new 
tasks or situations and result in improved performance. A better understanding of how 
person/role requirements influence team outcomes could also give better directions for how 
and when new training should be imposed on a team. In the following sections these issues 
are laid out in more detail.  
Shared mental models 
Salas et. al. (2005) reviewed 138 models from the team literature and proposed five 
factors that promote team effectiveness. These factors consist of team leadership, mutual 
performance monitoring, backup behaviour, adaptability, and team orientation. Salas et. al. 
(2005) suggest that shared mental models are the supporting and coordinating mechanism that 
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melds together the value of each of the five factors. This stems from the notion that teams 
working in high-intensity environments coordinate their activities efficiently when the team 
members are able to anticipate and predict each others’ needs. Knowledge about other team 
members enables the team to identify changes in the task or team and implicitly adjust 
strategies as needed to meet external demands. To facilitate coordination, Salas et al. (2005) 
emphasize that team members must have similar or shared mental models of the system with 
which they are interacting. Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) proposed four types of shared mental 
models. In addition to shared mental models of equipment, task, and interaction, they also 
suggest a shared mental model of team members.  The shared mental model of team members 
holds team specific information about each team members’ knowledge, skills, attitudes, 
preferences, and tendencies. Previous research on shared mental models has confirmed that 
technology/equipment models, task models, and team interaction models are important for 
team performance (Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Spector, 1996; Urban, Bowers, Monday 
& Morgan 1995; Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Milanovich, 1999). Despite a wide spread 
assumption that shared mental models of team members will facilitate team behaviours and 
outcomes, few empirical studies have examined this factor within the shared mental models 
theoretical framework. In one study, Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas (2009) 
found that commercial air traffic control teams with a history as teams were positively 
associated with requests for backup on the job. Furthermore, in a study of submarine attack 
teams our research group showed that crews with shared mental models of team members 
revealed higher levels of performance, showed more efficient communication patterns, and 
had lower cardiovascular arousal during high workload situations compared to crews without 
(Espevik, Johnson, Eid, & Thayer, 2006). This result emerged after controlling for knowledge 
about tasks and equipment, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the team (i.e. other 
elements of shared mental models). Findings are mixed, and the present study attempts to fill 
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this gap in the literature, given the frequent personnel rotation and reliance on team work in 
safety critical organizations.   
Transactive memory systems 
A theoretical perspective that has tried to explain effects of familiarity in teams is the 
transactive memory system Wegner (1986). In contrast to the concept of shared mental 
models, transactive memory systems is conceptualised as a set of distributed, individual 
memory systems that combines the knowledge possessed by particular team members with a 
shared awareness of who knows what. According to transactive memory theory each team 
member will use the other team members as an external memory aid, thereby creating a 
compatible and distributed memory system. Thus, team effectiveness depends on team 
specialization and increased capacity. Moreland (1999) posits that this will enable the team to 
plan their work more sensibly; assigning tasks to the people who will perform them best, and 
finally improving coordination because the team members can anticipate rather than simply 
react to each others behaviour. From laboratory experiments where small groups were trained 
to perform complex tasks (assembly radios); these researchers assessed the impact of various 
types of individual and group training on group performance. Their findings indicated that 
groups performed better when their members were trained together rather than apart and they 
suggest that the benefits of group training depended heavily on the operation of transaction 
memory systems (Moreland, 1999).  The transactive memory system theory and findings 
connected to it, offers insightful and important knowledge about team processes. However it 
is still an open question if transactive memory system represents the fourth content domain in 
the shared mental model theory, i.e. shared mental model of team members proposed by 
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993). The present study aims to address this issue and examine if 
transactive memory systems and shared mental models of team members are distinctly 
different and eventually where the boundaries between them are. One way to explore this 
question is to examine the learning process in teams over time. 
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Cross training 
One training strategy that is shown to foster shared mental models is cross training 
(Volpe et al, 1996, Cannon-Bowers and Salas 1998, McCann, Baranski, Thompson, Pigeau 
2000, Marks, Sabella, Burke, Zaccaro, 2002). Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) suggest that one 
outcome of cross training will be to develop transactive memory system. Cross training refers 
to a strategy in which each member is trained on the specific tasks, duties and responsibilities 
of his or her fellow team members. In most cases, cross training is seen as a way to ensure a 
robust and redundant system, where team members can fill in or replace each other if needed.  
Thus, in order for crosstraining to be optimally efficient, every team member must have 
complete mastery of all team roles.  A welcome side effect is that this training will provide 
team members with a clear understanding of how the entire team functions and how one’s 
particular responsibilities interrelate with other team members’. In essence, cross training can 
close the gap in team member’s person/role expectation, by enabling team members to 
anticipate the sorts of information and assistance that other team members need, increasing 
coordination and reduce the need for communication among teams. By rotating team roles, 
cross training will represent intense new learning opportunities for all team members. In the 
present study we were particularly interested in how shared mental models of team members 
would influence team performance and adaptation to a radically changed context represented 
by cross training and a high fidelity simulation exercise. To our knowledge, few previous 
studies have assessed differences in outcomes of shared mental models of team members 
when team members confront a series of new and unfamiliar training sessions represented by 
cross training and a high fidelity simulation exercise.  
The aim of this study is to isolate the effects of shared mental models of team 
members, while controlling for knowledge about the scenario and the technical aspects of the 
situation. One way to achieve this is to introduce all participants to a totally new situation, 
where they are left with little more than the knowledge they have of each other. In a situation 
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where all team members are unfamiliar with the task, there is little or no pre-existing 
knowledge in the teams of who knows what. Thus, with no specific transactive memory 
system, one is left with shared mental models of team members. On the basis of emerging, 
although limited, research on consequences of familiarity for teams in SCO’s, it is reasonable 
to assume that knowledge about other team members will positively influence the team’s 
performance and outcome (e.g. fewer errors, higher mission success, better accuracy, and 
latency; Griepentrog & Flemming, 2003, Mohammed, Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000, Stout, 
Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999).  Salas et al. 2005 propose that all four types of 
shared mental models enable the team to be more efficient. Based on the assumption that 
shared mental models of team members play an important part in team problem solving and 
are transferrable across tasks, we expect that teams with a shared mental model of team 
members will be increasingly efficient in cross training and more efficient in a complex high 
fidelity simulation, compared to teams with no shared mental model of team members. Thus, 
our first hypothesis will be:  
H 1: Teams with shared mental models of team members will learn faster and perform 
better (i.e. fewer errors, higher mission success, better accuracy, and latency) over 
crosstraining sessions and in a high fidelity simulation situation.  
Research into team effectiveness has shown that effective teams can maintain 
performance over time under conditions of high workload and when opportunities to 
communicate are limited (Kleiman & Serfaty, 1989). Effective teams are more effective at 
coordinating their activities using less explicit communication than less successful teams. 
Implicit coordination rests on the team’s ability to share a common understanding of the 
situation, which constitutes a core element of the shared mental model approach (Cannon-
Bowers et.al., 1993).  However, previous studies have focused on how teams perform in 
familiar rather than unfamiliar tasks. Little empirical evidence is available to shed light on 
communication and team coordination when teams with differences in shared mental models 
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of team members who are confronted with unfamiliar situations. In new and unfamiliar 
situations we expect that shared mental models of team members will facilitate explicit 
communication and coordination processes during initial learning sessions. After successful 
acquisition of new skills, the explicit coordination will be replaced by more implicit 
coordination as an index of team performance and learning.  
Based on this we expect to observe systematic differences in communication and 
coordination strategy between teams with and without shared mental models of team 
members. From this our second hypotheses are as follows:   
H 2:  Teams with shared mental models of team members will communicate more 
explicitly and implicitly compared to less experienced teams when confronting new 
and unfamiliar tasks. 
The explicit adjusting strategies that will take place will manifest itself in different 
ways if shared mental models of teammembers are to play a role in team coordination. A 
seemingly paradoxical effect will be that in order to coordinate their activity, teams with 
shared mental models of team members will increase the amount of communication they use 
when confronted with unfamiliar situations. Based on this assumption H2 could be 
operationalized as follows: 
H2 a: Teams with shared mental models of team members will have a higher rate of 
statements per minute compared to those starting with less experience as a team when 
confronting an unfamiliar situation.  
Salas et al. (2005) emphasize the presence of closed loop communication as a 
coordinating mechanism to avoid misunderstandings in communication and facilitate the 
continuous updating of the teams shared mental models. Closed loop communication implies 
team members confirms and repeats vital information such as time, place, geographical 
coordinates etc. Thus we expect that H2 could also result in: 
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H 2 b: Teams with shared mental models of team members will show more closed loop 
communication.  
Salas et al. (2005) emphasize that three out of five teamwork behaviours are closely 
connected to the shared mental model concept, that is adaptability, backup behaviour and 
mutual monitoring behaviour. Adaptability is defined as the ability to adjust strategies based 
on information gathered from the environment, which is dependent on backup behaviour, or 
the team’s ability to anticipate other teammembers needs and carry out actions to shift 
workload among members to achieve balance during high workload. Mutual performance 
monitoring is proposed as the ability to develop common understanding of the team 
environment and apply appropriate task strategies to accurately monitor other team members 
performance. We expect that shared mental models of fellow team members will facilitate 
adaptive communication and coordination processes when team members confront unfamiliar 
situations. From this follows that H2 also could manifest itself as follow:  
H 2 c: Teams with shared mental models of team members will show more 
adaptability, backup behaviour, and mutual performance monitoring behaviour over 
training sessions and in the high fidelity simulation scenario.  
In line with the shared mental model logic, all teams will increase their shared mental 
models of equipment, task and interrelations move towards a more implicit communication as 
the crosstraining evolves. Hence we expect the relative difference between the TMSMM and 
NoSMM groups in adaptability, backup, and mutual performance monitoring will be reduced 
over crosstraining sessions.      
The importance of shared mental models is proposed to increase as teams must 
perform in stressful conditions (Salas et. al., 2005). Team performance in ambiguous high 
fidelity situations will depend heavily on executive functions in team members such as 
attention, memory, and planning. Cognitive flexibility is seen as a particularly important asset 
when confronted with a rapidly changing and hostile environment. Adaptive team functioning 
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involves using and combining team role/resources in a flexible manner in order to cope with a 
rapidly changing dynamic environment. Teams with shared mental models will be more 
resilient to stress effects, due to their redundancy and ability to supply, substitute, or select 
information based on a superior understanding of team-role needs. Although stressors may 
reduce the amount of information flow, and team members may become more limited as to 
the tasks they can perform, teams with shared mental models of team members will be able to 
coordinate explicitly and implicitly when needed because of their knowledge of the 
person/role expectations in the team (Duncan, Rouse, Johnston, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & 
Burns 1996). This will put lower cognitive load on teams with shared mental models of team 
members compared to those without it. Knowing the other team members and that they will 
be able to provide support if needed will reduce perceived risk of failure and increase positive 
outcome expectancies. Gradual mastery of new tasks will result in fewer errors and more 
positive outcome expectancies over time. From this follows our last hypothesis:  
H 3:  Teams with shared mental models of team members will be less aroused (i.e. 
lower heart rate) over time as performance increases and the need for explicit 
communication and coordination decreases.   
 
Methods 
Subjects 
A total of 69 cadets from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy (mean age 24 years, 
range 21-32) were recruited to the present study. The subjects’ military service background 
ranged from two to 10 years, 10% were female officers, and the subjects’ ranks ranged from 
Sub-Lieutenant to Lieutenant. Although the training was mandatory, participation in the 
research project was voluntary. Six of the cadets declined to participate in the part that 
involved HR measurement. 5 subjects were lost due to equipment failure leaving a total of 59 
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for the HR measurement. None of the subjects had previous experience of the simulator or 
other forms of simulator training in general.  
Instruments  
Three consoles operating firing of missiles and receiving detected radar transmission were 
arranged in a triangular position facing each other. Computer software in the simulator 
recorded target solutions, firing range, hits, and course and speed of all aircrafts  
Verbal processes were examined using video and audio tape recordings (Sony TCM-
459V) and video (Sony Super Steady Shot Handycam video HI8 CCD TR2200E PAL) 
Physiological arousal 
  Cardiovascular responses were measured using Polar pulse watches. Heart rate (HR) 
was recorded as beats per minute (bpm).  
Performance   
Performance measures were based on transcripts from the simulator, and examined 
using criteria-based evaluation of efficiency and mission success (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 
1997).     
Performance scores were defined according to the specific objective of the mission, 
that is shoot down enemy aircraft and letting friendly through. To assess this outcome 
measure, a scoring system was developed, whereby high performance scores indicated a high 
level of mission success (see table 1). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 
--------------------------------------- 
In each of the training sessions, cross1, cross2, and cross3 there were 4 hostile and 2 
friendly. Total score obtainable was 18 points in each cross training session. In the high 
fidelity simulation there were 9 hostile and 2 friendly. Total score obtainable was 33 points.  
Outcomes of shared mental models of team members in cross training and high intensity simulations - 13 - 
 13
Team processes. 
The number of statements was registered as the total number of statements per minute. 
To categorize information further each statement was scored in accordance with Salas et. al. 
(2005) to mimic team behaviour indicating a shared mental model concept, i. e. adaptability, 
backup behaviour, and mutual monitoring behaviour. The present study focus on statements 
that are proposed to be connected to implicit communication, hence statements that were 
offered or carried through without being asked for by another team member. Thus each 
statement was categorized into: 
a. updates/priorities labelled as adaptability, (e.g.” we lost contact with 
contact” or “that target is our main focus now”):  
b. Presenting information, actions, solutions, labelled as backup, (e.g.: “the 
correct course is” or “I have given the target the correct bearing”). 
c.    Offered information, actions, solutions labelled as mutual performance 
monitoring. (e.g.: “I can give you the bearing now” or “Do you need a 
classification”).  
In addition closed loop communication was quantified as indicators of an underlying 
mechanism to update team members TMSMM and shared mental models in general. Closed-
loop refers to communication involving the sender initiating a message, the receiver receiving 
the message, interpreting it, and acknowledges its receipt and the sender following up to 
insure the intended message was received.   
d.   confirmation, labelled as closed loop (e.g.  “received” or “did you get the    
bearing I sent you?”).   
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Procedure 
Subjects were categorised as members of teams with shared mental models of team 
members (TMSMM) or without it (NoSMM). To be included in the TMSMM group, the team 
members had to have completed the first year of basic officer training together at the 
Norwegian Naval Academy. During this first year, the cadets are organised into permanent 
teams of six persons that stay together for eight months. During this period, the fixed teams 
share as a team the hardship of a number of extensive exercises as well as an eleven-week 
period on a tall-masted ship on a transatlantic crossing. This results in extended knowledge 
about individual differences in competencies, skills, abilities, preferences and tendencies in 
their fellow cadets (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Due to the outline of the simulator the 
original six member teams were randomly divided to two which gave 11 three member teams 
with TMSMM. 
The other category, the NoSMM group, consisted of cadets from another cohort at the 
Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. The participants had no previous history together, either 
as individuals or as members of other teams, except for a one-week getting acquainted period 
at the start of the semester.  Together, these subjects randomly formed a total of 12 three 
members’ teams with NoSMM.  
The study was carried out in a high fidelity simulator that is a replica of a naval operations 
room. Expert instructors from the Royal Norwegian Navy developed the scenarios used in the 
present study. 
 --------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 
--------------------------------------- 
The participants were informed about the study and invited to sign an informed 
consent. Pulse watches were administered and baseline HR was recorded while the 
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participants were seated. HR was recorded through baseline, crosstraining sessions, high 
fidelity simulation and recovery.  The subjects were told that the intention with the exercise 
was to discover how fast they were able to learn and cooperate. The officer cadets were not 
given monetary rewards, and were informed that the outcome of the exercise was not going to 
influence their military leadership grads.  Each team was told that the team which, after 
training, would perform best at the final test would be given the next high profile mission in 
the ongoing exercise they all were taking part in.  
During the training scenarios, the three member teams had to work interdependently 
towards a common goal of providing protection for an aircraft carrier in littoral waters. The 
aircraft carrier was at anchor and its protection (safety) depended on the team’s ability to 
shoot down unfriendly aircrafts and allow friendly aircrafts to operate in the area. This 
involved surveillance and coordination of air traffic in the area and subsequent military 
actions to protect the aircraft carrier.  This put great constrains on the team effort to 
coordinate their activities with limited time at their disposal.  The scenario was designed to 
include realistic stressors that gave the teams an increasing workload and a greater need for 
coordination and communication between the team members.   
Team members were randomly assigned to three different positions (team roles) in the 
operations room. These were: Early Warning (EW), Classification (CL), and Weapons control 
(WE). The main task of EW was to detect and get the bearing of unknown radar transmission. 
EW was then assigned to discover potential targets early and send the data (radar 
characteristics) to CL who then was able to classify them (from the checklist s/he solemnly 
held) as friendly or hostile. EW was also tasked to calculate speed and course on potential 
targets based on own and CL bearings. The main task of WE was to update the overall 
picture. The WE had a map of the area on the consol but no sensor to give him/her a bearing 
or radar characteristics. Thus, WE’s ability to fire missiles totally depended on the 
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cooperative work of all positions.  All team roles depended heavily on the performance of the 
other two.   
The study started with a 30-minute briefing on the scenario, consisting of setting, 
order, intelligence information, the outline of the simulator and functional demonstration of 
the equipment. This was followed by 30 minutes’ hands-on training on the designated 
position in the simulator.  
In order to examine effects of cross training, each team went through an identical 
training period consisting of three similar 20 minute scenarios; C1, C2, and C3. All 
teammembers rotated through each of the team roles in scenarios C1, C2, and C3. In the final 
scenario team members were again assigned their original role – the same as in C1. The high 
fidelity simulation scenario(S) was more intense, with more contacts from different 
directions, and higher workload. 
  After completion, a five minute HR recovery period was recorded. All recordings were 
obtained while the subjects were seated.  
Two paid, independent raters categorised the information exchange in the teams. They 
were unfamiliar with the shared mental model theory, the scenario and blind to the 
experimental set-up. Both raters were introduced to and trained in the use of the Noldus 
program (Noldus, 1991, Noldus, Trienes, Hendriksen, Jansen, Jansen, 2000).  The raters 
established a common understanding of the categories (adaptability, backup behaviour, 
mutual performance monitoring and closed loop communication) by rating three videos 
together before the actual recording of the videos. The inter-rater reliability showed an intra-
class correlation of .98 (p<.00).  
Results 
Descriptive statistics on performance and team process scores over test conditions for the 
TMSMM and NoSMM groups follows from Table 2 
 
Outcomes of shared mental models of team members in cross training and high intensity simulations - 17 - 
 17
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 
--------------------------------------- 
Performance scores 
The first hypothesis on systematic group differences in performance and learning over 
cross training sessions was explored by a 2(TMSMM vs. NoSMM) x 3(C1 vs. C2 vs. C3) 
factorial design (Ferguson, 1982), with independent ratings of mission specific success 
criteria as outcome variable. The first factor (groups) was treated as a between-group factor 
and the second factor (sessions) as a within-group factor in all analyses. Our findings revealed 
a main effect of groups during cross training sessions, F (1, 21) = 17.49, p < .001, with 
TMSMM scoring highest. In addition, a main effect of cross training was found, F (2, 42) = 
12.81, p <.00. A post hoc Tukey test revealed a steady increase in mission success over time 
from C1 to C2 and C3 (all p < .001). An interaction of groups by cross training sessions was 
also found, F (2, 42) = 3.34, p <.04).  A follow-up Tukey test revealed that the TMSMM 
group scored borderline higher from C1 to C2 (p <. 07) and to C3 (p <. 01) and significantly 
higher from C2 to C3 (p <. 01). The NoSMM group showed no differences across sessions. 
The TMSMM group scored higher than the NoSMM group on C2 (p < .01) and C3 (p < .01) 
(se Figure 2). 
 --------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 
--------------------------------------- 
Performance scores in the high fidelity simulation scenario (S) after cross training 
were examined using an unrelated t test. In line with hypothesis 1 our results revealed that the 
TMSMM teams (M = 17.78, SD = 5.93) showed significantly higher performance scores than 
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the NoSMM teams (M = 8.42, SD = 5.07, t (19) = 3.89, p < .001) during high fidelity 
simulations.  
Team processes  
Team processes scores were studied using a 2(TMSMM vs. NoSMM) x 3(C1 vs. C2 
vs. C3) factorial design (Ferguson, 1982) with outcome variables (team processes) as 
suggested in H2 a, b, c. The first factor (groups) was treated as a between-group factor and the 
second factor (sessions) as a within-group factor in all analyses. An independent-samples t-
test was conducted to compare team process differences between TMSMM and NoSMM 
teams during the high fidelity simulation.  
Total information exchange.   
In order to assess H-2 a total information exchange was analyzed as outcome variable. 
The results revealed that total statements per minute showed a main effect of groups, F (1, 18) 
= 18.7, p = .004 were TMSMM teams scored higher than NoSMM teams.  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare total amount of information 
exchange (communication per min) for teams with TMSMM and NoSMM. Teams with 
TMSMM showed more communication (M = 18.54, SD = 2.37) than the NoSMM teams(M = 
15.83, SD = 3.06, t(18) = 2.11, p < 0.05 during the high fidelity simulation.  
Closed loop  
In order to assess H-2 c indicators of closed loop communication (confirmation per 
minute) were used as outcome variable. Analyses of confirmations per minute showed a main 
effect of groups, F (1, 18) = 18.17, p < .001, with the TMSMM group showing more 
confirmations compared to the NoSMM group.  
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Furthermore, an interaction of groups by sessions was found, F (2, 36) = 4.81, p =.01. 
The Tukey post hoc test revealed that teams with TMSMM decreased from C1 to C3 (p < 
.001).  For NoSMM teams no difference found (see Figure 3).  TMSMM teams were higher 
(p < .001) at C1 and C2.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 
--------------------------------------- 
No differences on closed loop communication in the high fidelity simulation 
(Borderline p < 0.99)  
Adaptability 
In order to assess H-2 b indicators of adaptability (updates) were used as outcome 
variable. Analyses of updates per minute showed a main effect of groups, F (1, 18) = 12.95, p 
< .002, with the TMSMM group showing more updates compared to the NoSMM group.  
Analysis of updates per minutes showed a main effect through sessions, F (2, 36) = 
19.92, p = .001. A Tukey post hoc test showed increase in adaptability for from C1 to C2 and 
C3 (all p’s < .001). 
Furthermore, an interaction of groups by sessions was found, F (2, 36) = 3.18, p = .05. 
The Tukey post hoc test revealed that teams with TMSMM increased from C1 to C2 and C3 
(both p < .001).  For NoSMM teams no differences were found (see Figure 4).  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 
--------------------------------------- 
An independent -samples t-test was conducted to compare how often a priority or 
intention was voiced in the team (per minute). There was a statistic difference where 
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TMSMM teams (M = 2.19, SD = 0.47) showed significantly higher compared to NoSMM (M 
= 1.22, SD = 0.57, t (18) = 3.998, p < 0.01) teams during the high fidelity simulation. 
Backup  
In order to assess H-2 b indicators of backup (unsolicited help provided per minute) 
were used as outcome variable. Analyses of unsolicited help (information, solution to a 
problem or action) per minute showed a main effect of groups, F (1, 18) = 4.3, p < .005, with 
the TMSMM group showing more backup compared to the NoSMM group. 
Following up on H-2 b, indicators of backup behaviour were analyzed. An effect 
through sessions were found F (2. 36) = 7.94, p < .01. A Tukey post hoc test showed an 
increase from C2 to C3 (p < .001). No effect of interaction effects was found. 
Mutual performance monitoring  
No systematic differences emerged between groups and/or over time for scores on 
monitoring behaviour.  
Physiological arousal    
In order to examine H-3 indicators of arousal (HR) were used as outcome variable. 
Analyses of HR were performed using a 2 (TMSMM vs. NoSMM) x 6 (baseline vs. C1 vs. C2 
vs. C3 vs. S vs. recovery) factorial design (Ferguson, 1982). The first factor was treated as a 
between-group factor and the second factor as a within-group factor in all analyses. Tukey 
post hoc test were used as post hoc tests. Analyses of cardiovascular activity showed a main 
effect of all Sessions, F (5, 28) =11.191, p < .001. A Tukey test revealed a decrease in HR 
from baseline to C3 (p < .03), and to high fidelity simulation (S) (p < .04), and to recovery (p 
< .001). There was also a decrease from C1 to C3 and to S(p < .001).  Furthermore, an 
interaction of groups by sessions was found, F (5, 275) = 3.86, p < .002 (see Figure 3). Tukey 
post hoc test revealed that teams with TMSMM decreased HR from baseline to C3 (p < .03) 
and S (p < .04), and to recovery (p < .00). Finally, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that teams 
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with TMSMM decreased HR from C1 to C3 (p < .03) and S (p < .04), and to recovery (p < 
.001).   For NoSMM teams no differences in HR were found over time (see Figure 5). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 
--------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
In the present study TMSMM teams performed significantly better, hitting more 
targets than NoSMM teams at cross training sessions two and three, as well as in the high 
intensity simulation. The TMSMM teams increased performance over time, while no 
improvement in performance score was found for the NoSMM teams. The TMSMM teams 
also showed more process behaviour indicating higher adaptability and backup behaviour as 
well as more closed loop communication and confirmation during cross training and in the 
high fidelity simulation. Only the TMSMM teams revealed a marked decrease in physical 
arousal over training sessions.   
The present study extends previous research by presenting new empirical findings on 
the significance of shared mental models of team members in a naturalistic true to life setting. 
Salas et al (2005) proposed that the shared mental concept made a team more able to 
anticipate and predict other team member’s needs and identify changes in the team, task or 
teammates that would facilitate an implicit adjustment of strategies as needed. To explore this 
issue, the present study focused on a series of situations (i.e. cross training and the high 
intensity simulation) where team performance was dependant on team members ability to 
“identify changes in the team and teammates.”  Thus, all teams confronted a novel situation at 
the start of crosstraining and the high fidelity simulation.  
In this simulated naval threat scenario, our results showed that teams with TMSMM 
outperformed teams with NoSMM. When the team was faced with a new and unfamiliar 
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challenge, an interesting pattern in performance emerged over time. While there was no 
difference in performance scores during the first cross training session, only TMSMM teams 
improved over subsequent sessions and outperformed NoSMM teams after only one training 
session. These findings support our first hypothesis and could be interpreted as a strong 
indication that shared mental models of team members enables teams to learn an unfamiliar 
task faster.  One possible explanation could be that the team members in the TMSMM group 
have a more developed shared mental model of person/role expectations compared to the 
NoSMM group (Cannon-Bowers & Salas and Converse, 1993). This is supported by previous 
research and evaluations of the leadership training program at the Royal Naval Academy, 
which indicated that cohesion, interpersonal relations and perceptions of colleagues are 
shaped and heightened during basic officer training (Eid, Johnsen, Bartone, & Nissestad, 
2008). The leadership training exposes the teams to several demanding situations, allowing 
them to gain first-hand knowledge of each team member’s characteristics, abilities and 
tendencies (Polley, & Eid, 1990). Over a year, it is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
cadets have developed shared mental models of team members that will enable them to 
coordinate more effectively during cross training and high intensity simulations.  
The present study replicates and extends the findings of Espevik et al., (2006) where 
submarine crews showed better performance when the team was intact compared to situations 
where one team member was substituted with a member from another submarine crew. The 
present study indicates that, if a team faces cross training, TMSMM teams benefit more from 
cross training and outperforms the NoSMM group after a short crosstraining period. This 
implies that teams with TMSMM learn faster, although all teams started with no knowledge 
about the task or this type of training. Since the NoSMM did not show an improvement of 
performance scores over the training sessions, crosstraining strategy for newly formed teams 
must contain extended time to gain learning. When a novel situation arises it is therefore 
possible that TMSMM team will have an advantage to understand and consequently adapt to 
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the situation.  Our study suggests that these differences in performance may be explained by 
marked differences in communication/coordination process between the TMSMM and 
NoSMM teams.  
According to our second hypothesis, we assumed that the TMSMM teams would 
apply other adaptive strategies to enhance team communication and coordination when faced 
with a new and unfamiliar task compared to the NoSMM teams. First when the situation was 
new and unfamiliar to the team members, the TMSMM teams were more explicit in their 
initial communication to make sure that every team member got the proper information 
through more communication (i.e. statements per minutes) and more closed loop 
communication (confirmations) to ensure that every aspect of the situation was received and 
understood. Thus in contrast to the less successful NoSMM teams, the TMSMM teams 
developed and updated their shared mental models while they were engaged in problem 
solving and task work during the initial training scenarios. This finding may indicate an 
important distinction between task experts and task novices. in that subject matter expert 
explicitly attend to team process and information exchange during initial training and 
preparations. This study also shows differences in communication strategy when compared to 
the Espevik et al, 2006 study of seasoned submarine teams. The present study indicates that 
teams (TMSMM) with little prior knowledge of the task,  equipment, interaction approach  
high workload with higher amount of explicit communication in contrast to subject matter 
experts with TMSMM who decrease explicit communication (Espevik et al., 2006).  
Over time a notable difference in communication pattern revealed that TMSMM teams 
over time changed to more implicit communication compared to the NoSMM teams. This 
gives some support to the suggestion that the TMSMM teams were more attuned to changes 
in team and team mates and anticipated the needs of fellow team members. Salas et. al. (2005) 
proposed a strong connection between, adaptability, backup and mutual performance 
monitoring behaviour and SMM. They proposed that mutual performance monitoring, backup 
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behaviour and adaptability occurs more often in teams with adequate shared mental models.  
Teams with TMSMM showed as predicted (H-2 b) higher frequency than NoSMM teams on 
adaptability and backup behaviour.   
Contrary to what we expected, there were no differences between TMSMM and 
NoSMM teams in mutual performance monitoring. One explanation could be that the heavy 
workload reduced the opportunities for a team member to watch another team member due to 
time constraints. It is also possible that the TMSMM teams monitored each other more 
efficiently through verbal clues, like tone of voice indicating that help was needed and acted 
accordingly (e.g. offering action which was significantly higher for the TMSMM teams). The 
last argument is supported by the differences in adaptability, when TMSMM teams initiated 
more updates then NoSMM teams and backup where help (information, action, problem 
solving) was provided more often. Thus they anticipated more often than NoSMM teams that 
the team needed to share information or get something done and acted accordingly. This may 
be the most important difference connected to the availability of shared mental models and 
taken together with the results that the TMSMM teams showed higher rate of confirmations as 
well as outperformed NoSMM we advocate that this is the case.  
To our knowledge very few studies (Espevik et al 2006, 2010) have combined 
physiology together with SMM approach. This is somewhat surprising since several authors 
(Kleinman and Serfaty, 1989; Orasanu and Salas 1993; Salas et al, 2005) suggest that the 
importance of shared mental models as a coordinating mechanism increases in teams that 
must perform in stressful conditions. It is therefore interesting to measure physiological 
outcomes in high workload situations where shared mental models are most called upon and 
may increase resilience to stress (Salas et. al. 2005). In the present study only the TMSMM 
teams decreased HR from first cross training (C1) session to the high fidelity simulation (S). 
This implies that the TMSMM teams over time revealed a more adaptive and resilient 
response to higher workload when compared to the NoSMM teams. The superior performance 
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by the TMSMM teams strengthens this notion. We anticipated that the NoSMM group would 
be more physiologically aroused than the TMSMM teams when facing a high workload 
situation, as shown in the Espevik et al. (2006) study. Contrary to our hypothesis, no 
differences were found between the TMSMM and NoSMM teams. It is possible that in the 
present study the cross training itself affected and thus mediated the physiological arousal. A 
control group not participating in the cross training would have had the ability to uncover this.  
Another explanation of the results is offered by the transactive memory system (TMS) 
theory. Research based on the TMS approach has been concentrated on knowledge about the 
task the team is meant to solve and the team’s ability to draw on different memories of it held 
by different team members. This implies that a team with a well developed transactive 
memory may face challenges when a novel and or critical situation arise. The knowledge 
about how a team member behaves when he or she is almost overwhelmed by workload is not 
salient in this research and this knowledge may be vital for how they as a team coordinate and 
cope.  Moreland (1999) suggests as a strategy to confront unfamiliarity were every team 
member gives each other information of their own knowledge and skills pertaining to the task. 
This could be viewed as a personification of ordinary task work or shared mental models of 
people’s knowledge about equipment/task/interaction. However, if TMS caused the observed 
effect all teams would show an increased performance score since knowledge would be 
accumulated and shared. This would have been manifested as only a main effect of training 
sessions. This was not the case, since an interaction of Group by Sessions was observed. We 
suggest that the differences found in this study indicate that TMSMM is distinct and different 
from TMS, with an independent and added value to the coordination processes that explain 
the superior performance of the TMSMM teams in the final test situation.   
Limitations 
There are other possible explanations for why TMSMM teams outperformed the NoSMM 
teams. One factor that could have influenced the results was a possible learning effect of 
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being a cadet for a year at the Royal Naval Academy compared to one week.  Espevik et. al. 
(2010) found no differences in performance when studying two different cohorts of cadets in 
a simulator between first and the third year cadets. It is reasonable to believe that this also 
would be the case in the present study. 
Another explanation to the findings could be a difference in trust between the two groups. 
Recent literature shows increasing attention being devoted to trust as a precursor of team 
performance (Bandow, 2001). However, we argue that trust was adequately present in both 
the TMSMM teams and the NoSMM teams. This is based on Bandow (2001), who states that 
12 to 18 hours of face-to-face contact is required to instil the appropriate trust in a team. 
When the No SMM group started the study, they came straight from the introduction week at 
the Royal Norwegian Naval academy. This week involves an intensive teambuilding period 
with extensively face-to-face interaction with an aim of installing trust in the naval cadets. It 
is reasonable to expect that they were confident in each other and that the differences found in 
the present studies between the TMSMM group and the NoSMM group were attributed to a 
shared mental model of team members and not in the level of trust.  This is further supported 
by another study of cadets from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. According to 
Nissestad (2007), there were no differences from the first week and after the first year, on 
group climate or groups dynamics in the teams. He also showed that cadets are a 
homogeneous group, referring to personality factors measured by the NEOPi. The Nissestad 
study was conducted on five cohorts between 2001 and 2005, and it is still reasonable to 
expect that this would be the case for the participants in the present study.  
To sum up, the present study is the first study to provide empirical evidence for the effect 
of TMSMM during crosstraining. We conclude that teams that start with TMSMM will 
benefit more than NoSMM teams when performing cross training. It also implies that 
TMSMM is transferable across different tasks. Finally, TMSMM is distinctly different and 
with an added value to teamwork and subsequently to outcomes, than transactive memory 
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systems as it is proposed by Moreland (1999). The present study extends and replicates 
Espevik et al (2006, 2010) and gives further evidence to the proposed significance of 
TMSMM. We conclude that TMSMM is a mechanism that improves coordination evidenced 
by better communication strategies and resulting in enhanced learning of a new task, better 
performance, and outcomes in high workload conditions. Taken together, this knowledge 
expands previous knowledge, where the focus has been on equipment, tasks and team 
interaction, by demonstrating the importance of TMSMM in teamwork.    
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Figure captions 
 
 
Figure 1. Design for the study, TMSMM and NoSMM groups from baseline, through three 
crosstraining sessions (C1, C2, and C3), High fidelity simulation (S) and recovery.  
 
Figure 2. Performance scores during the three (C1, C2, and C3) crosstraining sessions, for 
the TMSMM and NoSMM groups. Error bars indicate 0.95 confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 3. Closed loop, confirmation per minute during the three (C1, C2, and C3) 
crosstraining sessions , for the TMSMM and NoSMM groups. Error bars indicate 0.95 
confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 4.  Adaptability, (updates per minute) during the three (C1, C2, and C3) crosstraining 
sessions, for the TMSMM and NoSMM groups. Error bars indicate 0.95 confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 5. Heart rate in beats per minute (bpm) for the TMSMM and NoSMM groups during 
baseline, crosstraining session 1 (C1), crosstraining session 2 (C2), crosstraining session 3 
(C3), High fidelity simulation (S) and recovery. Error bars indicate 0.95 confidence intervals. 
Outcomes of shared mental models of team members in cross training and high intensity simulations - 33 - 
 33
Table 1: Presents events and weights composing the Performance score. 
Event Score 
Hit hostile aircraft +3 
Fire, not hitting hostile +1 
Friendly aircraft through +3 
Hostile aircraft penetrate screen -1 
Friendly aircraft hit -3 
 
 
Table 2: Performance scores as mission success. Communication indicated as statements per 
minute for total amount, adaptability, backup, mutual performance monitoring and closed 
loop communication. Physical arousal indicated as beats per minute.   
                                         Variables 
 
 Point of measures 
H1 
Mission 
Success 
H2 a 
Total 
Amount 
H2 b 
Adapt- 
Ability 
H2 b 
Backup 
H2 b 
Monitor 
H2 c 
Closed  
Loop 
H3 
Physical 
Arousal  
Baseline TMSMM Mean       78.47 
SD       12.45 
NoSMM Mean       74.72 
SD       9.91 
C1 
Cross- 
Training session 1 
TMSMM Mean 5 18.09 0.35 0.16 0.31 3.356 79.79 
SD 2.45 3.08 0.31 0.12 0.17 0.74 12.86 
NoSMM Mean 4.64 14.79 0.34 0.04 0.28 2.24 75.71 
SD 2.2 3.14 0.44 0.05 0.23 0.3 8.76 
C2 
Cross- 
Training session 2 
TMSMM Mean 8.111  16.77 1.574 0.24 0.24 3.027 76.06 
SD 2.67 2.52 0.47 0.13 0.12 0.56 12.2 
NoSMM Mean 5 16.36 0.8 0.1 0.19 2.11 75.53 
SD 1.35 3.82 0.48 0.09 0.14 0.48 9.01 
C3 
Cross- 
Training session 3 
TMSMM Mean 11.442 16.59 1.57 0.22 0.14 2.6 73.39 
SD 3.8 3.13 0.55 0.12 0.11 0.69 11.5 
NoSMM Mean 6.75 15.84 0.89 0.14 0.25 2.1 74.25 
SD 4.25 2.81 0.59 0.16 0.32 0.59 8.87 
S 
High fidelity  
scenario 
TMSMM Mean 17.783 18.54 2.195 0.14 0.25 2.98 73.47 
SD 5.9 2.37 0.47 0.08 0.14 0.64 10.92 
NoSMM Mean 8.41 15.83 1.22 0.14 0.18 2.45 75.13 
SD 5.07 3.06 0.56 0.32 0.16 0.69 9.51 
Recovery TMSMM Mean       70.15 
SD       9.4 
NoSMM Mean       72.24 
SD       8.9 
1. TMSMM higher than NoSMM (p<.001).   2. TMSMM higher than NoSMM (p<.001).   3. TMSMM higher than NoSMM (p<.001).     
4. TMSMM higher than NoSMM (p<.001). 5. TMSMM higher than NoSMM (p<.001). 6. TMSMM higher than NoSMM (p<.001). 
7. TMSMM higher than NoSMM (p<.001). 
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